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INTRODUCTION
The present Federal Government of West Germany, which took office on
October 22, 1969, is committed to a program of internal reforms, including the im-
provement of policy planning.1 The new emphasis on government efficiency is already
evidenced by three distinct innovations in Chancellor Brandt's cabinet: the reduction
in the number of ministries from 19 to i5; the elevation of the Chancellor's Office to
Ministry status; and the establishment of positions of Parliamentary Secretary in all
ministries.
These innovations were greatly facilitated, and perhaps even made possible on
such short notice, by the work of the Project Group for Government and Admin-
istrative Reform, which was established less than a year earlier by a Cabinet Com-
mittee of seven, headed by Chancellor Kiesinger. The Project Group submitted its
first report on August 3, 1969-too late for consideration before the elections of
September 28, and, indeed, so close to them that it was treated as confidential until
the votes were in?' The report was released early in October, 1969. It is likely to be
of interest to American readers not only as an indication of current West German
thinking on government organization and reform, but also because of the compara-
tive insights it affords.
Students of government reorganization in the United States will recall that the
Brownlow Committee appointed by President Roosevelt in 1936 consisted of three
eminent Wise Men (Brownlow, Merriam, and Gulick) in academic and civic
research organization positions, assisted by a relatively small staff of experts with
similar backgrounds. Not so well known, perhaps, is the fact that Louis Brownlow
found it "impossible to get any presidential funds for study abroad," and that Lindsay
Rogers, whose work on British and French central administrative institutions was
considered to be of signal importance for the President's Committee on Administrative
Management, could not be appointed to its staff? While this hurdle was to some
* The manuscript of this article has been checked for factual accuracy by the Federal Chancelor's
Office of the Federal Republic of Germany. However, the author is, of course, exclusively responsible for
all evaluations.
** Professor of Law, Duke University.
I See especially Chancellor Brandt's policy statement of October 28, x969, conveniently reproduced
in Die Welt, October 29, 1969 (Air Mail Edition); English translation in 17 Tm BuLLETIN No. 4 (Supp.
x969).
2 See Dim SPIEGEL, Aug. 25, x969, at 26-27.
8 L. BROwNLOW, A PASSON FOR ANOmymIrTrY 353 (1958). For a collective biography of the Brownlow
Committee, see B. KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGAN1ZATION AND REFORM[ IN THE NEW DEAL. THE GENESIS OF
ADINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, 1900-1939 (1963).
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extent bypassed by the use of outside funds, the classic Report of the Brownlow
Committee does not contain any foreign country materials and shows little overt
evidence of the influence of comparative studies.4
By contrast, the West German Project Group consisted of ten senior civil servants,
headed by an official of the Chancellor's Office and composed of representatives of
the ministries that made up the Cabinet Committee, plus a delegate of the Federal
Accounting Office who, like his chief in the Cabinet Committee, participated in an
advisory capacity only.5 It thus corresponds more nearly to an Inter-Agency Task
Force in the United States. The Project Group had its own Secretariat, conducted
extensive investigations, and was solely responsible for the report ultimately sub-
mitted. Nevertheless, it obtained voluminous information and some advice from a
dozen consultants. These consultants were mainly German political scientists and
academic lawyers (two of the latter, including the present author, teaching in the
United States); and the substantive topics of their reports ranged from the process
of political decision making on the Land (state) level to systems analysis. There
are no less than seven country studies: one each on Austria, Italy, Switzerland,
France, and Great Britain, and two on the United States.6 These studies were given
careful and sometimes detailed attention in the report of the Project Group. It is
perhaps worth noting that at least four of the twelve consultants received part of
their training in law in the United States, and that a fifth is an English professor
of political science.7
The following is a brief survey of the first report of the Project Group and of
'A classic example of the indirect influence of another system of government is the famous recom-
mendation of the Brownlow Committee that the President be given a small number of executive assistants
who "should be possessed of high competence, great physical vigor, and a passion for anonymity." Thr
PREsIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMIrrEE 5 (1937). This
language was apparently first used by Tom Jones to describe Sir Maurice Hankey. In a message sent via
Mr. Brownlow to President Roosevelt in summer, 1936, Mr. Jones had expressed the opinion that the Pres-
ident would best solve his problem by finding "that one man who would turn out to be another
Maurice Hankey." BRowNeow, supra note 3, at 357, 381, 396-97. See also KARL, supra note 3, at 230,
282 n.20; T. JONEs, A DIARY WITH LETrEns, I93I-I95O, at 216, 307-08, 312-X3 (1954).
' The Cabinet Committee consisted of Chancellor Kiesinger and the Ministers of or for Interior,
Justice, Economics, Federal Questions, Scientific Research, and Finance, as well as the President of the
Federal Accounting Office. For details, see I PROyExTORUPPE FUR REGIERUNGS- UND VERWALTUNGS-
REFORM , ERSTER Bsucsrr zuR REFORM DER STRUrTUR VON BUNDESREGIERUNG UND BUNDESVERWALTUNG 2
(x969) [hereinafter cited as Frst REPORT]. See also Theis, Reformen im Regierungssystem der Bundes-
republik, 2o Aussaus'oiarns 677; Theis, Fahrungsinstrumentarium und politische Planung, id. at 735
(i969); Theis, Stand der tiberlegungen zur Regierungsreform in Bund, 3 DIE VERWALTUNG 72 (1970)-
the first reports by an insider.
' Reports on Austria, Italy, Switzerland, and France by Professor I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, University
of Cologne, 2 FIRST REPORT I, 35, 71, 1oi; on Great Britain, by Professor Nevil Johnson, University of
Warwick, id. i33; and on the United States, by Dr. Christian Determann, Yale Law School, and by the
present author, id. at ISo & 205.
7These are Determann, Baade, Scharpf, and Friauf; and Johnson (see note 6 supra). The then Min-
ister of Justice and the present Minister in the Chancellor's Office, Professor Horst Ehmke, has also studied
in the United States and is a noted authority on American constitutional law. See H. EmmE, WmTscHFtr
UND VERPASSUNG. DIE VERs'ASSUNGSECITSPRECHUNG DES SUPREME COURT ZUR WIRTSCHAPTSE GULIERUNG
(I96i); Ebmke, "Delegata Potestas von Potest Delegari," A Maxim of American Constitutional Law, 47
CORNELL L.Q. 50 (ig6x).
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official reactions thereto, and a discussion of the importance of comparative and
country studies for this project. In conclusion, an attempt is made to relate the
present stage of West German government reform more closely to the United States,
using as a background the present author's memorandum to the Project Group,
entitled "The Constitutional Position and the Government Machinery of the Pres-
ident of the United States."
I
TiE FRT REPORT: GOVERNIENT REORGANIZATION
The First Report of the Project Group for Government and Administrative
Reform, dated August 3, 1969, consists of two volumes, 273 and 681 pages in length.
The former contains the Report itself, and the latter, called "Appendix," reproduces
the consultants' studies.
In agreement with the Cabinet Committee, the Project Group limited its investiga-
tions to three topics: (i) the delimitation of the spheres of competence of the
federal ministries; (2) parliamentary secretaries, ministers of state, and ministers
without portfolio; and (3) the improvement of the governmental machinery of the
Federal Chancellor and Government. Its recommendations were made against the
background of three policy decisions of the Federal Cabinet and the Cabinet Com-
mittee. First, there were to be no amendments to the Basic Law (or West German
Constitution) until Fall, 1969. Second, the Project Group was to set out alternative
courses of decision. Third, its recommendations were to take account of pre-
existing reform measures, and not to prejudice future, more comprehensive reform
measures 8
A. Reorganizing the Federal Ministries
By way of introduction, it should be pointed out that the reorganization of the
federal government in West Germany, including not only the transfer of functions
from one agency to another but also the creation, fusion, or abolition of federal
ministries, is basically a preserve of the Executive. The latter's competence in this
area is limited only by specific legislative acts of an organizational character which-
at least in the absence of appropriate delegations of authority-are binding upon
the Executive until or unless amended or repealed, and the general necessity of
obtaining Parliamentary approval for budget positions This latter, in effect,
prevents the creation of permanent positions without approval by Parliament. In a
Parliamentary system of government, which is premised on the support of the govern-
ment of the day by a working legislative majority, these two limitations are hardly
of overriding significance.
Furthermore, a newly elected Parliament votes only on the Chancellor, not his
i Fxnsr REPoRT, supra note 5, at 3-5.
'See generally E. B6CKyNcENP5E, DIE ORGANISATIONSGEWALT IM BEREICI DER REGrrtUNG (x964).
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Cabinet; and the Chancellor-elect is subject only to political, not to legal, restraints
in his initial decision as to the composition of the Cabinet and the number as
well as the functions of the Ministries to be kept or created.' Thus, with a new
Federal Government to be constituted in Fall, 1969, and with a reasonably broad
mandate for reform, the Project Group had considerable leeway in its recommenda-
tions on reorganization.
i. The Proposals
The Project Group proceeded from the basic premise that the composition of
the Cabinet should be governed by four principles, which were to some extent in
conflict: First, there was to be a division of labor by -the allocation of discrete spheres
of competence. Second, it was desirable to maximize the participation of politically
potent powers in the Cabinet. However, third, the effectiveness of the Cabinet as a
decision-making body was not be jeopardized by too large a number of Cabinet
positions; and, finally, excessive subdivisions of spheres of competence were to be
avoided.
There was widespread agreement among the politicians and senior civil servants
consulted that the Kiesinger-Brandt Cabinet, composed of 19 Ministers in addition
to the Chancellor, failed to meet the third requirement just listed. Although noting
the absence of hard evidence, the Project Group tended to agree with this judgment.
However, it rejected the optimum size of collective decision-making organisms, put
at seven to nine by modem organization theory, as too small for present purposes.
Such a group could not represent the entire political Executive of a complex modern
industrial state like the Federal Republic of Germany. (It will be noted that the
Federal Cabinet is a constitutional organ of prime importance in West Germany;
this will be developed in detail further below.")
Instead of seeking to establish optimum Cabinet size at the outset, the Project
Group proceeded directly to the study of the existing organization chart of the
federal ministries, with a view to determining where there was room for the
consolidation of functions and the abolition of redundant agencies. Among the
advantages to be derived from such consolidations, it noted the reduction of juris-
dictional disputes, of duplication, and of the necessity for coordination at the Cabinet
level; greater flexibility in assigning priorities within large organisms; more possibil-
ities for the delegation of tasks to subordinate units; and savings in personnel through
the elimination of central administrative agencies.
On a somewhat higher level, the rational consolidation of functions was to lead
to a reduction of imbalance between the various ministries, the allocation of coin-
petences by "task affinity," and the realization of the optimal size of ministries,
taking into account existing possibilities for reducing the workload of cabinet
10 For a recent summary, see Rein, Die verassungsrechtlichen Kompetenzen des Bundesprsidenten
bei der Bildung der Bundesregierung, 1969 JtRIsTENzEIUNG 573.
"
1 See p. 637 infra.
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ministers. As regards the factor of imbalance, the Project Group rejected the
"budget slice" of the various ministries as a dependable criterion. The number of
senior civil servants was a more reliable factor, but the ultimate decision would have
to rest on the relative political weight of each individual ministry.
In accordance with its mandate to proceed on the basis of existing structures,
the Project Group accepted as given the continued existence of a certain number
of ministries. These included the five "classical" or "of" ministries based on the
Prussian constitutional tradition: the Foreign Office and the Ministries of Interior,
Justice, Finance, and Defense. Among the so-called "neo-classical" ministries, i.e.,
those "for" ministries that antedate the establishment of the Federal Republic, no-
body among those interviewed had raised doubts as to the continued existence of
the Ministries for Economics, Agriculture, Labor, and Transport. Furthermore, in
view of the present preeminent importance of science and technology for modern
industrial society, the Project Group added the Ministry for Scientific Research to
the organizational core.
That left nine minstries as potential candidates for dissolution. Only one of
these, the Ministry for Postal Services and Telecommunications, was neo-classical;
the remaining eight were what has become known as "prefab" ministries, ie., cre-
ations of political expediency or necessity since 1949. One of these, the Ministry
for All-German Affairs, was declared as off limits: due to the special and delicate
nature of intra-German relationships, the tasks of this ministry could not be allocated
to the Foreign Office or the Ministry of Interior. This decision was candidly acknow-
ledged to rest on political grounds.
The seven "prefab" ministries marked for possible extinction, along with Postal
Services and Telecommunications, were Health, Economic Cooperation, Treasury
(Federal Property), Housing, Refugees, Federal Relations, and Family. Since the
Project Group refused to accept the premise that the public importance of a
specific task area was as such sufficient justification for the establishment of a
separate cabinet ministry,'2 it did not hesitate to tear down the "prefabs." All three
of the alternative models proposed provided for their elimination. Postal Services
and Telecommunications was spared on the ground that its abolition might prejudice
more general reforms. Furthermore, it was suggested that cabinet-level status might
be desirable in view of the international operations of the postal and telecom-
munication services.
The minute details of the three alternative reorganization schemes suggested
are hardly of interest here. The third model, envisaging twelve cabinet ministries,
would integrate the various "prefab" ministries into the existing classical and neo-
classical ministries; the Ministry for Federal Affairs was to be merged into the
Chancellor's Office under all three models. The first and the second models, each
calling for thirteen cabinet ministries, contemplated the creation of one new min.
1 Fmsi, REo.r io. See afso p. 658 infra.
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istry, termed Ministry for Social Affairs or Ministry for Structural Planning, re-
spectively. The Ministry of Social Affairs (Model I) would encompass the entire
former Family Ministry; the Home Construction Division of the Housing Min-
istry; and the Human and Veterinary Medicine and Food divisions of the Health
Ministry. The Structure Ministry (Model II), on the other hand, would con-
sist of the Health Ministry's Water, Air, and Noise Division and all divisions of
the Housing Ministry. All three plans envisaged the merger of the Economic
Cooperation Ministry into the Foreign Office, and the Refugee Ministry into the
Ministry of Interior. The latter was by far the largest beneficiary under all models;
its senior staff would grow from the present level of 254 to 34o, 380, and 480, re-
spectively, under Models I, II, and III.
Since these plans were elaborated in constant contact with those directly affected,
the Report already reflects some reaction to the proposals that were to emerge.
The Ministries for Economic Cooperation and of Housing submitted detailed state-
ments of their positions. Far from being resigned to its fate, the former asserted
that optimal efficiency in the area of foreign assistance required the abolition of
Foreign Office tutelage as well as the transfer of capital assistance functions from
the Ministry for Economics. In the judgment of the Economic Cooperation Min-
istry, a cabinet of "about 15" would still be able to function as an effective policy-
making unit. 3
The Family Ministry, on the other hand, conceded that initial expectations in
the special efficiency and drive of small ministries created for particular tasks had
not been justified by experience, and that these special tasks would have been
pursued with better results by a larger ministry with major subdivisions. It never-
theless opposed the consolidation of all the "prefabs" into one super-ministry, and
proposed the creation of a Ministry for Social Affairs that was to be roughly of
the same political importance as the Ministry of Labor, and which would encompass
all areas of social policy not covered by the classical and neo-classical ministries. This
would include family, youth, sports, health, and social and housing assistance.
The Project Group rejected the proposal of the Economic Cooperation Ministry
as unsound, and incorporated the Family Ministry's suggestion into its Model II.
It also rejected a proposal by an interest group for the creation of a Ministry for
Construction on the same grounds that led to the rejection of all strictly technocratic
ministry models.14 Nevertheless, all three concrete proposals for reorganization
were to achieve almost total success.
1 5
In addition to the major task of reducing the number of ministries through con-
solidation, the Project Group also discussed several proposals for the transfer of
functions between ministries that would continue to exist. It made several recom-
"5 Communication from the Ministry for Economic Cooperation, of July 31, 1969, 1 Fmsr REPORT
134; and of May 28, x969, id. at iio, 130.11 See id. at 32-33.
"'See p. 632 infra.
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mendations in this connection, with Models I and II calling for more shifts than
Model III. These proposed transfers of divisions and subdivisions do not seem to be
of major independent significance. The Project Group expressly rejected a sug-
gestion that monetary policy be concentrated in the Ministry of Finance so as
to deprive the Ministry of Economics of its key position in macro-economic planning.
It also rejected a proposal to transform the Ministry for Scientific Research into a
Ministry for Science and Technology, with responsibility not only for research
planning and subsidy, but also for the economic exploitation of advances in tech-
nology. However, there was a strong collective dissent on this point from within
the Project Group itself. An individual dissent, also relating to this area, called for
a radical reorientation of educational and training policy in science and technology,
with emphasis on all levels rather than extrapolations from the university prototype,
On a different level, the Project Group opposed the establishment of a Coordina-
tion Ministry; experience had shown that coordination among equals was beset with
too many difficulties.' 7 While noting, and approving of, consultation arrangements
between individual ministries, the Project Group also recommended against extensive
use of standing cabinet committees. This would, in its judgment, not only unduly
tax the time schedules of the ministers and thus lead to stand-in representation by
senior civil servants without political authority, but would also limit the information
level of ministers who were not members of the committees.
2. Implementation by the Brandt Government
Some indications of the effect of the recommendations of the Project Group can
be gathered from the cabinet list as approved on October 22, and from the new
Government's first policy statement before Parliament on October 28, 1969. The
Federal Cabinet now consists of 15 ministries, or perhaps more accurately, 14 min-
istries and 15 ministers. Besides the five classical "of" ministries, it includes six
of the seven previous neo-classical ministries. Postal Services and Telecommunications
has lost ministry status after all, and is currendy merged with Transport. Among
the "prefab" ministries scheduled for liquidation by the Project Group, Home Con-
struction and Economic Cooperation survive. The former was originally scheduled
for extinction but was saved by a massive "mayors' revolt."' There is a new Min-
istry for Health, Family, and Youth, indicating the more or less general acceptance-
subject to the exceptions noted-of the Project Group's Model I, which also appears
to be the one preferred by it. The Chancellor's Office is now headed by a cabinet
minister-the former Minister of Justice who was one of the members of the
original Cabinet Committee of seven. The Ministry for Scientific Research has been
renamed Ministry for Science and Education, which indicates some responsiveness
I Fmsr REPORT 59-6o, 68-71.
'
T Id. at 21. See also pp. 659, 66o infra.
chEscenburg, Bonns kleine Kabinetusreform, DiE Zarr, December 23, 1969, at 6.
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to the ideas expressed in the lone dissent on educational policy in the Project
Group's First Report' 9
In his policy statement of October 28, Chancellor Brandt stated that "a govern-
ment talking reform has to start with itself." He mentioned the reduction in the
number of ministries and a first reorganization of competences that had already taken
place, and pledged continued efforts to "delineate responsibilities more clearly and
to avoid duplications of effort." The structures of the Chancellor's Office and of
the Ministries are to be modernized along with their working methods; and Parlia-
ment has been promised not only a new table of organization, but also a listing of
the composition and the spheres of competence of the Cabinet Committees that had
been established by the new government. The Post Office is to receive new legal
status with a view to assuring sound management along business lines. As regards
education policy, the Chancellor came very close to the ideas expressed by the dis-
senter in the Project Group; and his emphasis on the interaction between scientific
research and economic development appears to parallel the views of the collective
dissent.20 Nevertheless, it seems quite clear that internal economic development
through technological innovation will remain a primary responsibility of the Ministry
for Economics?'
A press report notes that the Brandt Government's reorganization of the
cabinet and reassignment of functions among the surviving ministries "largely
corresponds to the plans elaborated by the Project Group for cabinet reform." It
thus seems that so far as reorganization is concerned, the First Report of the Project
Group has been remarkably successful. Despite the survival of two ministries
marked for extinction by it, even the Project Group's estimate of senior personnel
savings through the elimination of central administrative agencies, placed at between
8o and ioo (out of a total of 5,248), appears to have been remarkably accurate.2
B. Strengthening the Political Executive
In keeping with the Prussian tradition of government organization, the prototype
of a West German federal ministry consists of several divisions (Abteilungen), each
of them subdivided into sections (Referate). These are headed by senior civil
servants, with a State Secretary at the summit of the hierarchical pyramid. The State
Secretary is a so-called "political" civil servant, as are, under the law, but to a much
lesser extent in practice, the Ministerial Directors who head the divisions. This
means that they can be dismissed for purely political reasons at any time, subject,
however, to very considerable civil service "waiting status" or retirement benefits.
10 See p. 632 supra. For the cabinet list, see DIE WELT, October 22, i969, at i (air mail edition).
10 See p. 632 supra; section VIII of Chancellor Brandt's policy statement of October 28, 1969, supra
note x. All translations from the German are the present author's.21 d. at §§V, VIII.
" Zundel, Kabinetsverkleinerung in Bonn, DIE Z=aT, November 4, 1969, at i.
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The Brandt Government has made use of its dismissal powers with respect to
Ministerial Directors in only eleven cases (out of a total of iio).
Almost invariably, the Ministerial Directors achieve their positions by merit
promotion from within; lateral movement is very limited and entry from the out-
side at this level, quite exceptional. The State Secretary, who is the administrative
head of the ministry and the regular representative of the minister, usually shares the
fate of his immediate superior, as, seemingly, did all State Secretaries in CDU-
headed ministries in the Fall of 1969. He is frequently brought in from the outside,
and will have some likelihood of a similar appointment when his term is ended
for political reasons. Since federal laws are normally executed by the states in their
own rights, the corresponding positions in state government are not unattractive,
as are even some top positions in municipal government. Despite this high-level
fungibility dependent upon political alignments, the typical West German State
Secretary at the head of a federal ministry has a career civil service background.
This system has produced some of the best statesmen-bureaucrats in history.
It has also suffered some of the most ineffectual cabinet ministers. "Don't tell me
what to sign; just tell me where to sign," is a German old saw directed at cabinet
ministers; and the traditional view of Prussia-Germany at its peak is that of a
"Beamtenstaat"--a bureaucratic state.
The disadvantages of such a system are known, or at least suspected, since Max
Weber's famous polemic.' However, it was not until the formation of the Kiesinger-
Brandt coalition and West Germany's secular decision for the modern positive welfare
state that serious efforts were made to strengthen, in a systematic manner, the political
component of the federal Executive.
The Parliamentary State Secretaries Act of April 6, 1967, provides for the
appointment, from among the members of Parliament, of parliamentary state secre-
taries, to serve at the pleasure of their respective cabinet ministers. The functions of
these secretaries are not defined in the Act itself. However, its legislative history
indicates substantial agreement to the effect that they were to (i) assist cabinet
ministers in their political activities, and thus strengthen political leadership within
the Executive; (2) in particular, maintain and improve contact with Parliamentary
institutions, political parties, and the public; (3) relieve cabinet ministers of duties
primarily of a ceremonial nature; and (4) obtain the chance to gather experience
for a subsequent cabinet-level political career.24
In the Kiesinger-Brandt Government, parliamentary state secretaries were ap-
pointed for the Chancellor's Office, the Foreign Office, and five other ministries:
2" Note especially ch. l1-IV of his PAWUMLENT uND REGIERTNG iM NEUGEoRDmTEx DEtrscm.AN rev.
ed. x918), conveniently found in M. WEB R, GEsAMELTE POLrZ1ScH" SCMUFrEN 294, 299 et seq.
(J. Winckelmann, 2d ed. 1958).
2A Fns REoaR 142-45; see generally Wahl, Die Welterentwicklung der Institution des Par-
lametarischen StaatssekretArs, 8 DER SmAAT 327 (x969); H. IAuPri, DER PAnLA.ENTAUsci m STAATS-
sEK--EXR (,969).
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Interior, Finance, Economics, Defense, and Transport. Thus, at the time of the
preparation of the Project Group's first report, an appraisal of the functioning of this
new political office in the West German federal system had to be based on slightly
over two years' experience in substantially less than half the ministries.
A basic premise of the Project Group Report is that its recommendations on
ministry reorganization described above, as well as its proposals for the improvement
of the instruments of government of the federal Executive to be discussed further
below, are inseparably linked to the need for increasing the political efficiency of
individual cabinet ministers. Thus, its approach to the subject of parliamentary state
secretaries is generally characterized by a desire to strengthen a budding political
institution, taking into account all relevant experience to date.
The Project Group gathered quantitative data as to the politically significant
activities of the parliamentary secretaries of state, and gathered additional informa-
tion through detailed questionnaires. Its most significant finding was that the parlia-
mentary state secretaries had virtually replaced the civil servant-state secretaries as
their ministers' representatives in Parliament, especially in question period activities.
In addition, the Parliamentary State Secretaries of the Finance and Interior Min-
istries had made statements of Government policy in Parliament; and the latter
had, a few times, delivered the opening statements in support of Government bills. 5
As regards cabinet affairs, the record was somewhat uneven. In accordance with
§ 23 of the then current Rules of Procedure of the Federal Cabinet, only the Parlia-
mentary State Secretary of the Chancellor's Office was regularly entitled to attend
all cabinet meetings. Cabinet ministers not in personal attendance could authorize
either the Parliamentary State Secretary or the (civil-service) State Secretary to
attend; in the absence of specific ministerial direction, the latter attended. A min-
ister attending a cabinet meeting may, at his choice, be accompanied by either his
parliamentary or his civil-service state secretary, but not by both at the same time.
Attendance at cabinet meetings by persons other than the Chancellor and cabinet
ministers is for purposes of information only. In view of the constitutional nature of
cabinet membership, only a minister may hold another minister's proxy for purposes
of cabinet decision.
The figures compiled by the Project Group indicate that only the Parliamentary
State Secretaries of the Chancellor's Office and the Foreign Office were more or less
regularly in attendance at cabinet meetings, although by no means at all of them.
The record of the other Parliamentary State Secretaries in this respect is quite un-
even. In one case (Interior) there was a striking reduction in attendance, seem-
ingly coincidental with a change in personnel6
A more important issue, expressly left open in the 1967 law despite initial govern-
ment wishes to the contrary, is the position of the Parliamentary State Secretary
11 x FiRsT REPORT 148-53 and tables I-Ill thereat.2 Id. at 153 and table III.
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within each individual ministry, and especially his relationship to the (civil-
service) State Secretary. Here, responses to the pertinent six-question segment
of the Project Group questionnaire reveals identical practices in only three respects.
All Parliamentary State Secretaries were entitled to information and access to the
files pertinent to their assigned tasks; all regularly received information on all
matters of political or basic significance; and-most significanly-all Parliamentary
State Secretaries conducted their relations with their respective ministries exclusively
through the conduit of the (civil-service) State Secretary. The Project Group
further determined that none of the Parliamentary State Secretaries had been assigned
a position that made his office an additional level in the ministry's hierarchy. How-
ever, in three ministries, they had been given operative tasks, and were entitled
to issue directives (through channels) within the scope of these tasks. Other di-
vergencies relate to the channelling of official papers to the minister from below.
In one ministry, these had to go through the Parliamentary State Secretary; in
three others, he routinely received copies.2 7
The Project Group recommended that Parliamentary State Secretaries be
appointed for all federal ministries; that they be placed in the minister's office so
as not to constitute a new level in the ministry hierarchy, and that they be qualified,
as before, to assume direct operational tasks at the specific direction of their respective
ministers, but only through regular channels, i.e., through the (civil-service) State
Secretary. None of these changes required additional legislation. In addition, how-
ever, the Project Group also recommended that the Parliamentary State Secretaries
be redesignated Ministers of State, and that their selection not be confined to mem-
bers of Parliament. The former would underline the political nature of the office
and possibly add weight to its representational qualities, especially on the inter.
national level; the latter would enlarge the scope of political recruitment and at the
same time mitigate against the danger of talent depletion in the parliamentary party
of the government of the day.
The two recommendations last mentioned would require legislation, which has
not as yet been sought. The other recommendations of the Project Group have
gained ready acceptance by the Brandt Government. Parliamentary State Secre-
taries have been appointed for all cabinet positions; their rank initially included
Professor Ralf Dahrendorf, the noted sociologist and political "idea man" of the
minor coalition partner. This evidences a basic decision in favor of further strengthen-
ing the political Executive at the cabinet ministers' level through the expansion of
the role of the Parliamentary State Secretaries. Furthermore, the Rules of Procedure
of the Federal Government have been amended so as to make the Parliamentary
State Secretary the regular representative (to the extent constitutionally possible) of
his Minister before both Houses of Parliament and in the Cabinet, and to render him
independent of the civil service State Secretary with respect to within-Ministry
71d. at 148-5o and table 1.
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administrative tasks (including the operative supervision of Divisions) specifically
delegated to him by the Minister.28
II
POLITICAL PLANNING FOR THE SEVENTIES
A. The Frame of Reference
The Project Group had initially been assigned two tasks in addition to govern-
ment reorganization and the strengthening of the political Executive. These were
improvements in the governmental machinery of the Chancellor and in the func-
tioning of the Cabinet. However, in due time, these latter two topics came to be
regarded as so intimately interconnected that the Report treats both of them under
the collective heading "Improvement of the Governmental Machinery of the Federal
Chancellor and Government."
i. Constitutional Considerations
To some extent, this fusion of assigned topics was influenced by constitutional
considerations. The mandate of the Project Group, it will be recalled, specifically
excluded recommendations requiring amendments of the West German Basic Law,
or Constitution, for their implementation. Thus, the balance struck between the
various components of the political Executive by article 65 of the Basic Law had to
be accepted as given for present purposes. Article 65 is to a large extent the legacy
of Bismarck's unique combination of Prussian and Federal elements in the 1871
Constitution, with some accretions in later years2 It contains three basic principles
governing competence within the political Executive which appear to import
separation-of-powers thinking into the realm of one of the classic component powers.
The first is the Chancellor Principle: the Chancellor determines the directives of
government policy. The second is the Department (Ressort) Principle: within the
framework of these directives, each cabinet minister has individual authority and
responsibility in the administration of his department. The third is the Cabinet
Principle: differences of opinion between cabinet members (but not between the
Chancellor and one or more cabinet members) are resolved by the cabinet, which
consists of the Chancellor and the ministers.
The Chancellor's power to determine general governmental policy is augmented
by what has been termed the substantive cabinet formation power of the Chancellor-
elect. The latter includes decisions as to the number of ministries and the delimita-
" Zundel, Kuddelmuddel um Minister-Stellvertreter, DiE Z-EiT, December 23, 1969, at 6; § 23 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Federal Government, as amended on February I9, 1970, conveniently repro-
duced in U. EcHTER & H. LAuFER, REGiEREN IM VER ASsUNGssTAAT 252, 258-59 (1970). For a recent
account, see DR SpmEGEL, March x, 1971, at 41-43.
2
, E. JuN=R, DIE R C-rILANIENKOMPETENZ DES BtIDE5sKAZLERs 4-44, 70-75 (x965). Ct. Menzel,
Die heutige Auslegung der R'chllnienkompelenz des Bundeskanzlers als Ausdruck der Personalisierung
der Mact? 2 DIE MoDES NE DEMOYRT'TE UND IHm REc T 877 (i966).
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tion of their functions, as well as the selection of incumbents. A necessary corollary
of these powers, not spelled out in the Basic Law itself but generally recognized
by accepted authorities, is the power to secure the dismissal of individual ministers
after the process of cabinet formation has been completed.
Still, the department and cabinet principles are more than mere ornamental
trappings of what has been referred to as a "Chancellor's Democracy." The cabinet
principle is of special vitality, since virtually every important political action by
the Executive is termed a Government action by the Basic Law, and hence requires
a cabinet decision. There might be more doubt as to the value of the department
principle; attempts by constitutional lawyers to endow it with justiciable constitu-
tional protection have met with some levity by seasoned political observers. Never-
theless, it is quite clear that all three principles enunciated by article 65 of the
Basic Law are constitutional principles; and that at least in theory, they can be
enforced by constitutional adjudication which in West Germany extends to juris-
dictional disputes between organs of government. Much more importantly, it is
also generally recognized that while the working interrelationship of these three
principles shifts from time to time and in response to political and personality
factors, there is a general obligation of constitutional magnitude not to create addi-
tional imbalances through organizational devices30
To sum up: the Project Group had no mandate to recommend changes of the
Constitution, and thus necessarily had to shun all schemes that would permanently
dislocate the precarious but nevertheless constitutionally ordained balance between
the Chancellor, the individual cabinet ministers, and the Federal Cabinet as an aggre-
gate political organ. This meant, as a practical matter, that the task of improving
the efficiency of the Chancellors' Office could not be pursued independently of the
objective of making the machinery of the cabinet more effective. (The Department
Principle had already received special attention in the portions of the Report dealing
with reorganization and, more particularly, parliamentary state secretaries and
ministers of state.)
2. Intermediate-term Budget Planning
In addition to the above-discussed constitutional constraints, the Project Group was
subject to the cabinet's directive that preexisting reform measures be taken into
account. Chief among these was intermediate-term budget planning-a secular
contribution of the Kiesinger-Brandt Government to the West German political
system.
Students of public administration will recall that in August, 1965, President John-
son had directed the extension of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System to
all federal departments and agencies. Almost exactly one year later, an astute man-
'°See the consultations of Professors Klaus Stern and Heinrich Friauf, both of the University of
Cologne, in 2 Fnssr REPORT 563, 607.
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agement analyst could still confidently observe, with respect to West Germany:
"Politically, any overt extension of programming or planning schemes is less feasible
now than it has even been.",'' West Germany was regarded as fully committed to
the "Politics of Non-Planning," and even a leading expert study of budgetary
processes, while recommending intermediate-term budget planning at the federal
level, had carefully added that this would be for informative forecasting purposes
only. It solemnly warned against any attempt to make forecasting the basis of
control "by any means," and against any far-reaching subdivision of the data, "or
else the market economy would be in danger." 32
Endangered, indeed, it was. Late in 1966, the holy cow developed lactation
problems; and almost overnight, everything changed. West Germany's economic
recession was reflected in the governmental sector by a budget crisis. Public dis-
closure of a monumental overestimate of revenues not only brought down the govern-
ment of the day, but also gravely impaired confidence in the budgetary tools and
methods then available and practised. The Kiesinger-Brandt Grand Coalition Gov-
ernment that took office on December i, 1966, was indeed not so much a product of
coalition arithmetic as the political expression of a general realization that radical
governmental reforms were called for. In a federal state saddled with the legacy of
a paleo-liberal ideology with pretensions of constitutional anointment, such reforms
could only be achieved by a government that commanded the requisite support for
amending the Basic Law practically at will. While a coalition backed by over 90
per cent of Parliament was clearly recognized to be a serious deviation from the
norm of responsible parliamentary government, this deviation was expressly ac-
cepted, on a temporary basis, as the only device suited to bring about the basic
reforms now demanded by all concerned.
The Kiesinger-Brandt Government promptly secured a constitutional amendment
designating macro-economic equilibrium as a goal of federal and state budget
making, and authorizing Parliament to enact guidelines for anti-cyclical budget
management as well as "budget planning for periods of several years." This express
constitutional recognition of planning as a governmental task was accompanied by
the Act of June 8, 1967, for the Support of Economic Stability and Growth. The
latter lists four specific budget planning goals: price stability, high-level employ-
ment, foreign trade equilibrium, and economic growth. The Government is directed
to elaborate and to lay before Parliament intermediate-term budget plans. These
plans cover periods of five years, and are regularly adjusted in the light of sub-
sequent insights and developments. Federal ministries are directed to maintain
investment plans on a current ten-year basis 3
" H. ARNDr, Wasr Gar m: PoLITIcs op NoN-PLANNING 122 (1966).
"Quoted in id. at 99.
"' See generally Stucken, Die Haushaltspolitik im Gesetz zur F'rderung der Stabilitdt und des Wachs-
turns der Wirtschat vorn 8. Juni z967, 27 FiNArZARCnV 202 (i968); Weichmann, Finanzplanung als
staatliche Aulgabe, id. at 22o; Hettlage, Problerne einer mehriihrigen Finanzplanung, id. at 234; and for
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Budgetary estimates are still prepared by the various ministries and revised, as
well as coordinated, by the Budget Division of the Ministry of Finance. Intermediate-
term budget planning is also initiated by a special subdivision of that Ministry, and
then channeled through a Cabinet Committee headed by the Chancellor and com-
posed so as to exclude the "major consumers" of federal funds. Initially, this Com-
mittee included the Ministers of and for Finance, Economics, Federal Property, and
Federal Questions. While the Cabinet Committee is responsible for the coordination
of the intermediate-term budget planning process and for the elaboration of alterna-
tive planning proposals, the ultimate power of political decision rests with the whole
cabinet as a constitutional organ.
In the past, cabinet decisions in this area have consisted of ceilings for individual
ministries worked out primarily on the basis of ministry estimates, but also in-
corporating decisions as to magnitude and priorities based on more general con-
siderations of economic policy (e.g., high-priority support of transport and research).
In time, and as experience accumulates, it is expected that decisions of the latter type
will become the central factor in intermediate-term federal budget planning. 4
The process of intermediate-term budget planning described above has now been
extended to the states. A constitutional amendment of May 12, 1969, authorizes
federal legislation establishing common guidelines for the federal and state govern-
ments for budgetary law, anticyclical budget management, and multiple-year budget
planning. An Act of August 12, 1969, adopted just before the recess of Parliament
precedent to the September elections, makes the adoption of intermediate-term budget
planning mandatory on the state level as of January x, 1972, and establishes a
mechanism for joint state-federal budget policy making. t' These constitutional and
legislative extensions of the intermediate-term budget planning system would appear
to provide the federal government with an ideal panel of instruments for the
economic and monetary policy guidance of a dynamic modern economy.
It is, perhaps, good to recall that on the eve of West Germany's constitutional
crisis that triggered the developments here described, a senior official of the Bundes-
bank had pessimistically compared the federal administrative apparatus to a sym-
phony orchestra which, while proficient in the classics and in the "popular operatic
melodies" preferred by the Adenauer Government, was likely to reveal serious weak-
nesses when asked to perform modern compositions. Even a star conductor might
legal discussion, K. STERN & P. MiUNCH, GESETZ ZUR F6RDERUNG DER STABILITXT UND DES NVACHSTUMS
DER WnIrsCHAFr (1967) and the minutes of the annual meeting of German academic constitutional
lawyers in Bochum on October 3, x968, with reports on dffentlicher Haushalt und lVirtschaft by Pro.
fessors Friauf and Wagner in 27 VERBFFENTLCHUNGEN DER VERINIGUNG DER DetrrscueN SmTArsnrccr-
sIEHRER I & 47 (x969). Friauf, id. at IO-39, furnishes exhaustive further references.
SI FIRST REPORT 192-95; BUNDEs MINISTARIUM DER FINANZEN, FINANZBERICHT 1968 at 506-5, 23r-
39 (I967)- Cf. G. DENTON, M. FoRsYTH & M. MACLENNAN, ECONOMIC PLANNING AND POLICIES IN
BRITAIN, FRANCE AND GEMuANY 227-29 (1968).
"
5 Act of May 12, z969, [I969] I BGBT. 357 (art. 109(3) of the Basic Law); Act of August 19,
1969, [1969] i BGBI. 1273.
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fail before an orchestra that approached Schnberg, Bartok, or Stravinsky (scil.
anti-cyclical economic policy, intermediate-term budget planning) with hesitation;
"and let us remain politely silent about Stockhausen and Boulez (modern weapons
systems; research planning)."3" Less than three years after this devastating indictment,
the Project Group Report notes:
Intermediate-term budget planning is the most completely developed instrument
of planning at the federal government level. In its methodology and technique,
it occupies a leading place in the Western world even if compared to the PPB
System of the United States federal government 7
B. Goals and Critical Inventory
The Project Group regarded its task of recommending improvements in the
governmental machinery of the Chancellor and the Cabinet as tantamount to a
mandate to develop organizational schemes for effective political planning by the
Executive. It started with the assumption that only the service state is adequate to
the needs of modern man in modern society, and that "the service state which actively
shapes society . . .must increasingly develop a policy based on concepts derived
from a comprehensive view of social, economic, and technological change, and thus
able to constantly supply innovation impulses, i.e., impulses for new, consciously di-
rected developments." '38 A few years ago, such a basic premise would have been rank
heresy; today, it has become common property. The Project Group was even able
to cite as authority a policy declaration by Chancellor Kiesinger on March ii, 1968.
But although the ideology of political planning had been received into con-
ventional wisdom, government and administrative institutions had not fully responded
to present-day requirements. The Project Group found that while on the whole, the
West German system of government and administration was generally deemed
to stand up to critical comparison with economic enterprises or with foreign political
systems, it was quite widely regarded as unequal to the task of political planning as
defined above. Critical voices referred to a basic style of pragmatic case-by-case
reaction instead of the consistent pursuit of long-range policy; to the lack of adequate
planning tools and methods in the Chancellor's Office, the Cabinet, and the min-
istries, especially as regards the basis of information; and to ambiguity and short-
term orientation of political goal decisions and value judgments of the Chancellor
and the Cabinet. On a somewhat more technical level, there were complaints about
the dual function of cabinet ministers, with department management encroaching
upon political functions. The traditional bureaucratic apparatus of the ministries
was felt to be unequal to its new tasks, prone to prefer quick compromise to the
elaboration of political alternatives, and inclined to pursue its own goals or tradi-
" Hiittl, Koordinierungsprobleme der Bundesregierung, 6 DER STRUT I, 15-16 (1967) (manuscript
of a lecture given on October 20, z966).
x Fxasr REPORT 192. See also id. at 244-45; p. 66o infra.
8 Id. at 184.
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tional tasks. The isolated creation of planning sections in various ministries was
criticized as leading to imbalance in the Cabinet, and to patchwork rather than
comprehensive planning.
This wide array of criticism was sufficient to induce the Project Group to under-
take its own inquiries into the most important phases of the political decision
process within the federal government. These inquiries revealed, in its judgment,
that the traditional system had some inherent limitations which were bound to
increase with further governmental expansion and compartmentalization. The
subdivision and compartmentalization of substantive responsibilities within the
hierarchical organization scheme of ministries was found to have no less than four
dysfunctional effects upon the intake and the evaluation of information. Since in-
formation intake was determined by subject-matter competence, the perspectives of
lower organizational units were necessarily limited. Routinization of the intake
process was conducive to blocking both the intake and the evaluation of decisive
information. Information tended to be more complete where there was pressure by
social groups or organized interests; hence there was the danger of an information
disequilibrium within the organization. This danger was further enhanced, finally,
by the dominance of individual information preferences, made possible through the
lack of a uniform information system.
On a somewhat different level, an increase in the number of organizational units
was likely to limit the interaction between leadership and the line, thus further en-
hancing the significance of the value preferences of individual line officials in the
decisional process. Finally, there was a general lack of organizational units for the
elaboration of long-range perspectives. Planning staffs presently in existence were
plagued by limitations of substantive competency; lesser units were too hard-pressed
by routine duties to make significant contributions to the process of long-range goal
definition.
The Project Group found that some of these difficulties inherent in the hier-
archical compartmentalization of ministries had been mitigated by the increasing use
of inter-ministry committees? 9 Still, in its judgment, this committee device was
unlikely to be a satisfactory tool for the collective shaping of a concept-oriented
policy. The prevalent technique of assigning the chairmanship ((Federfihrung) to
the ministry most directly concerned tended to favor competence-oriented bureaucratic
thinking; and chairmen were likely to keep their committees as small as possible,
thus minimizing conflicts of interests or potential conflict situations. Standing com-
mittees might be more useful, but in addition to the difficulties just mentioned, the
limited powers of the participants militated against the development of innovative
functions.4°
9 See, in this connection, H. Psuon, DIE INTE -MNISrRrELLZN AusscsissE O .DER BUNDESmINISTETIN
(1968).
oz Fn=r REPoRT 188-89.
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Probably the most devastatingly negative finding of the Project Group concerns
the control of political decision making. Current mechanisms were mainly limited
to controlling the administrative execution of the measures decided upon; this was
true even as regards budget control. In the absence of sufficiently clear definitions of
the goals to be achieved, there could be little if any control of the efficiency of actions
in terms of purposes.
This searching critique of extant instruments for policy planning was to some extent
counterbalanced by the conclusions derived from the foreign-country and West Ger-
man State studies commissioned by the Project Group. These showed, in its
judgment, that the problems found to exist in the West German federal govern-
ment were also to be found, to a lesser or greater extent, in these other systems of
government; that certain peculiarities were essentially the products of historical
developments; and that all governments included in the survey were facing new
tasks that required adaptations of the traditional systems of government. The most
important finding in this regard deserves quoting in full:
The constitutional position of government institutions is only of minor sig-
nificance in relation to existing inadequacies. Comparable deficiencies are found
in the Presidential, Cabinet, and Chancellor systems. Therefore, none of the prob-
lems could be solved merely by, for instance, introducing the Presidential system
in the Federal Republic. 41
C. Improving Policy Planning Through Reorganization
i. Policy Planning and Budget Planning
As already mentioned, West Germany has an intermediate-term budget planning
system which compares favorably, in the opinion of the Project Group, to the PPB
System at its current stage of development in the United States. Since reform pro-
posals were to be integrated, so far as possible, into pre-existing reform programs, an
obvious question was whether the intermediate-term budget planning system might
serve as the nucleus for a general policy planning system. The Project Group con-
sidered this possibility at some length, and arrived at a negative conclusion.
In essence, the view prevailing would appear to have been that policy planning
and budget planning are complementary but not coextensive; that both derive
advantages from a dialectical relationship based on independence but interdepen-
dence; and that both would suffer from the fusion of budgetary and political
planning processes. Budget planning took no account of nonmonetary capacities;
it was geared to relatively short-term sequences (five years). An expansion of its
functions would necessarily lead to the inclusion of the "largest consumer" min-
istries in the Cabinet Committee for intermediate-term budget planning. This would
be highly undesirable. Furthermore, the preeminent position of the Finance and,
to a lesser extent, the Economics Ministries in intermediate-term budget planning
" Id. at 19o. See also p. 659 infra.
LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
would not be extended to policy planning as such without strong resistance to the
notion of an "inner cabinet" which was in derogation of the cabinet principle
(article 65 of the Basic Law).
Another reform proposal called for the transfer of intermediate-term budget
planning responsibilities from the Ministry of Finance to the Chancellor's Office.
This proposal, and even a more modest variant which called for the transfer of
Federfiihrung to the Chancellor's Office, did not find the Project Group's approval.
In its judgment, the intermediate-term budget planning process was so intimately
connected with the general process of estimate revision and consolidation that it
could not be carried out effectively by any unit other than the Budget Division of
the Ministry of Finance. The specialized knowledge of the latter would be im-
possible to duplicate elsewhere. On the other hand, the Project Group recom-
mended that the intermediate-term budget planning memoranda of the various
ministries be made available, as a matter of course, to the Chancellor's Office. This
would increase the flow of information and eliminate duplication of efforts at the
individual ministry level.
2. Expanding the Chancellor's Office
The Project Group noted that in recent years planning sections had been estab-
lished in several federal ministries. While these had undoubtedly contributed to the
rise of "problem consciousness" in the bureaucracy, their effectiveness had suffered
from the organizational polarity between staff and line. The planning sections did
not have independent information networks; and the line divisions and sub-
divisions could not be depended upon to supply the information required. Further-
more, privileged access to the political executive by units without line responsibilities
gave rise to frictions.
The planning mechanism of the Chancellor's Office, on the other hand, was
regarded as more promising. This is not discussed in detail in the First Report,
but some pertinent information has become available recently.42 Early in 1967, the
Kiesinger-Brandt Government created a Planning Staff in the Chancellor's Office.
This staff was headed by a civil servant of Division Chief (Ministerialdirektor)
rank; but its personnel included non-career civil service academic and other experts
employed on a contractual basis. Furthermore, the Planning Staff had an advisory
council composed of seven professors of various disciplines at German universities;
and it had authority to contract for outside policy research and advice. A textbook
illustration of the workings of this, in Prussian-German terms, fairly revolutionary
planning organism, is the government reorganization project here described.4 3
'aLompe, Die Rolle von Sachverstindigengremien im Prozess der poltischen Willensbildung, 16
ZEITSCHIUFr IrUM POLIfrl 223, 250-59 (1969).
'Bckenf~rde, supra note 9, at 187-91, goes so far as to assert the unconstitutionality of the
establishment of a political planning staff in the Chancellor's Office. We are reminded of Heinz Wag-
ner's remark that the West German academic constitutional lawyer receives his journeyman's certificate
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The Project Group recommended that the policy planning functions of the
Chancellor's Office be substantially expanded. It also recommended that these func-
tions be directed by a close associate of the Federal Chancellor of the day who had
ready access to the latter, and whose position in the hierarchy of the political Executive
was such that he would be accepted as an equal by the cabinet ministers. As for the
organization of individual policy planning projects, within-government task forces
were deemed most promising. Such task forces were to be composed of members
of the ministries concerned and the Chancellor's Office, under the direction of the
latter. The federal ministries had the highest level of information in their respective
sectors; and "without the intake of this information, but also without knowledge
of the sectoral balance of competing social interests achieved by the various min-
istries, uniform political planning on the Cabinet or Chancellor's level would hardly
be possible." '
The Brandt Government appears to have accepted these recommendations. For
the first time in West Germany, the Chancellor's Office is headed by a cabinet min-
ister. Personnel changes within this office seem to have been particularly rigorous,
with apparently full utilization of the power to dismiss political civil servants,
and some transfers of career civil servants as well. The current budget authorizes
8o new positions in the Chancellor's Office, bringing its total personnel to over 300.
The Planning Staff, which is now headed by a professor of economics in his middle
thirties, has been enlarged in size. Its members participate in top-level policy con-
ferences within the various ministries. There is a budget item for the development
of systems analysis in the Chancellor's Office 5
On the other hand, this massive increase of the powers of the Chancellor's Office
(and, hence, of the Chancellor and his "personal" cabinet minister) has given rise to
some resistance. The new Minister of Defense, in particular, is reported to have
demanded a binding delimitation, in writing, of the functions of the Minister in
charge of the Chancellor's Office; and one of his first acts has been the establishment
of a Policy Planning Staff in the Ministry of Defense. It is perhaps significant to
note that this latter staff was organized by a well-known, American-educated strategy
commenator on temporary six-month leave from the leading West German weekly
paper.46
upon proving that something is unconstitutional, and becomes a master craftsman upon showing that
it cannot even be done by constitutional amendment. Wagner, Urn ein neues Verasungsveandnis,
1968 DiE 6FrpamTscim VERwAL-UNG 604, 605.
94 1 FiRsT REPORT 20I.
Ar See DiE WELT, May 2, 1970, at 6; June 22, 197o, at 2 (air mail edition). For a recent detailed
account, see DER SPEGE, Feb. 1, 1971, at 28-38.
"
0Dr. Theo Sommer of Die Zeit. See DIE WELT, November 3, 1969, at i (air mail edition). The
Minister in the Chancellor's Office has also had difficulties in replacing a number of career civil servants
in the Chancellor's Office with persons more receptive to the policies of the present Government. For
one view of this matter, see Reuter, "... ausserhalb der Legalitdt"? 2o DR DayrsCuM BEa2n, 43
(1970).
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D. Towards New Departures in Planning Organization
The Project Group did not regard its recommendations for the expansion of the
planning facilities in the Chancellor's Office as a substitute for a more basic re-
structuring of the political planning process. The expansion recommended would
be useful primarily for testing, experimentation, and personnel training purposes;
it would not obviate the need for a comprehensive political goal-planning machinery.
In view of its limited mandate, the Project Group did not consider mechanisms
such as an Inner Cabinet, which required constitutional amendments for their
implementation. Instead, it developed three alternative organizational prototypes
against the background of article 65 of the Basic Law, which, as discussed above,
bars the creation of a functional disequilibrium between the Chancellor, Cabinet,
and Department principles therein laid downy
All three models call for a permanent central Task Force or Working Group for
Political Planning. This agency is to be headed by an official of the Chancellor's
Office whose position is such as to assure close contact with the Chancellor and the
cabinet ministers. The other members of the Task Force are to be the planning
officials of the various ministries. Their designation is to depend, from case to case,
upon the task at hand.
Political goal decisions are, of course, reserved to the Chancellor and the Cabinet.
Program planning decisions, on the other hand, are to be made in the ministries.
Each ministry is to have a Planning Board directly subject to the Minister and the
State Secretary, but the planning process is to be largely the work of ad hoc task
forces at the Division level. These task forces are to include at least one member
without line responsibilities, who will serve as his division's representative on the
ministry's Planning Board.
As regards personnel, the Project Group deemed political confidence and innovative
potential to be of prime importance. It therefore recommended that especially in
the higher positions, public servants be assigned planning positions on a non-
permanent basis; and that care be taken, on the Chancellor and Cabinet level, to
include officials from all ministries. Significantly, it also recommended that efforts
be made to attract experienced personnel from private industry and the universities-
presumably on a short-term basis.
The three alternative prototypes for the central Task Force for Political Planning
are, in the main, reflections of different concepts of the optimal balance between the
Chancellor, Cabinet, and Department principles governing the organization of the
political Executive pursuant to article 65 of the Basic Law. Model I emphasizes
the Cabinet principle. The Task Force receives its impulses from its members as
instructed by their respective superiors, i.e., the Chancellor and the various Ministers.
Draft political programs are submitted to the Cabinet for discussion and general
approval, and then routed to the various ministries with instruction to develop
1T See p. 637 supra.
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implementation plans. These are checked by the Task Force for compliance with
basic policy decisions and for optimal coordination, and submitted by it to the
Cabinet for final approval. This latter also serves as the basis for intermediate-term
budget planning.
Model II is based on the predominance of the Chancellor principle. It con-
templates the establishment of a well-staffed Planning Division in the Chancellor's
Office. Planning impulses are transmitted to it by the Chancellor, acting either on
his own initiative or in response to suggestions by the Cabinet or individual min-
isters. Draft political programs received by the Cabinet for initial discussion are thus
the product of the Chancellor's Office as instructed by the Chancellor. The Task
Force becomes operative only at the penultimate stage of checking and coordinating
individual Ministry implementation plans for final approval by the Cabinet. Again,
this latter serves as the basis for intermediate-term budget planning.
Model III is a combination of the Chancellor and Cabinet principles. It gen-
erally corresponds to Model I, with the difference that both the Chancellor and the
Cabinet can give instructions for the initial planning phase to the Task Force, and
that the latter has a policy planning staff that corresponds in size to that contemplated
by Model II but is organizationally independent of the Chancellor's Office.
At the present writing, the Brandt Government does not appear to have decided
in favor of one or the other of these three prototypes. However, the enhanced
position of the Chancellor's Office suggests a built-in bias in favor of Model II. There
would seem to be some political as well as constitutional objections to this model,
which are not entirely dispelled by the First Report of the Project Group and its
supporting consultations.48 A search for a "non-political" alternative, such as
a Planning Office headed by the (large ceremonial) federal President,49 seems
somewhat quaint. Still, the current West German Federal Government, which has
achieved so much by way of government reform in so little time, is not likely to
expose itself needlessly to major constitutional criticism when developing its long-
range political planning mechanism. While the three organizational prototypes
suggested by the Project Group will undoubtedly have some impact, none of them
seems currently destined for formal adoption.
HI
Tim UsEs op ComPAxrnvE ANALYSIS
Louis Brownlow, it will be recalled, found it "impossible to get any Presidential
funds for study abroad."5 The West German Project Group, on the other hand,
was quite unencumbered by parochial purse strings. It commissioned no less than
's See note 30 supra and, for the constitutional problems arising from the separation of powers doc-
trine, the consultation of Professor Friauf, 2 Fn r Ras'orr 607.
' This was envisaged by K~ble, Wider die Expertokratie, DiE WELT, November 8, 1969, Geistige
Welt section, at i (air mail edition).
go See p. 626 supra and note 3 thereat.
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seven country studies, two of which deal with the United States and were undertaken
there. These studies are reproduced in full in the Appendix of the Report, and their
findings are summarized in a special section of the Report itself51 Repeated refer-
ences, to be discussed further below, indicate a pervasive awareness of foreign institu-
tions and practices.
In the following, an attempt will be made to gauge the significance of these
foreign studies, and of the comparative insights based on them, for the work of the
Project Group. By focusing on the present author's report on the United States, it
is hoped to obtain some insights which might be of interest to American students
of government organization. Furthermore, an analysis of "comparative government
at work" might furnish some more general insights as to the practical utility of that
discipline.
A. "The Constitutional Position and Government Machinery of the
President of the United States": Seven Questions and Answers
The foreign country studies are based on a uniform set of seven questions drafted
by the Project Group, in some instances augmented by subsequent inquiries on
specific points. The seven questions concern (i) the real position of the Chief of
Government in the governmental system, especially as regards establishing and en-
forcing uniform governmental policy; (2) his major instruments for executive
leadership, including machinery for policy planning and supervision; (3) the Chief
of Government's information system, including the reporting methods of the
ministries (departments) as well as information derived from other sources; (4)
the real division of power at the summit of the governmental system, especially
problems of coordination and methods for their solution; (5) permanent representa-
tives of the Chief of Government, and their competences; (6) parliamentary state
secretaries, ministers of state, or ministers without portfolio, and their relations with
the regular departments and the bureaucracy; and finally (7) the deficiencies of the
present system and efforts at reform. In addition to these standard inquiries, the
Project Group also requested information from the present author on problems of
coordination between the President's political staff and the federal bureaucracy, and
on the current status of ,the PPB System.
The standard inquiries are dearly inspired by the West German system of
government and by the mandate of the Project Group to recommend improvements
not requiring constitutional amendment. They are therefore more pertinent to
parliamentary government than to a presidential system. Nevertheless, the Bureau
of the Budget was mentioned by way of illustration in question 2; there were two
country studies on the United States which together take up almost one-third of
the space allotted to foreign materials; and the specific inquiries just mentioned
indicate a lively interest in the practical workings of the American system.
n 2 Fhsr RPorT 1-265; I id. at 248-68.
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There is hardly any need here to set forth in detail those portions of our study
that are descriptive of the formal constitutional system of the United States. Start-
ing with Professor Hermens' felicitous description of the President as "combining
the functions of the British Queen and Prime Minister, and absorbing, in his
second capacity, the constitutional powers of the entire British cabinet,"' 2 it is
pointed out that the constitutional problems posed by article 65 of the Basic Law53
simply do not exist in the United States. The real constitutional problem is
coordination between the President and Congress, not coordination within the
Executive. The limitations imposed upon Executive leadership by the separation
of executive and legislative powers is illustrated by fairly detailed references to
government reorganization, the appointment power, legislation and budgetary
matters, and control over independent regulatory commissions. Not much time is
spent on the problems referred to in questions 5 and 6, relating to permanent
representatives of the President and executive representation in Congress; the per-
sonalized unitary executive principle inhibits the former and the incompatibility
rule obstructs the latter. Nevertheless, it is pointed out that in recent years, there
has been an amazing extension, both by statute and by executive order, of the
functions of the Vice President-a development that has since continued.5V 4 Further-
more, mention is made that the constitutional prohibition of membership in Con-
gress by persons "holding any office under the United States" has not prevented
the occasional use of Senators and Congressmen on diplomatic missions, nor even
the formal codification of that practice in the United Nations Participation Act of
1945.'
Like so many other things, it is observed, such practices and even institutional
mechanisms are entirely dependent upon their political and practical attractiveness
for the current incumbent of the White House. This reflects the cardinal con-
clusion of the study, made in the context of information networks (question 2) but
" F. H_ mENS, TiE REPRESENTATIVE REPUBLIC 464 (1958).53 See p. 637 supra.
"' At the time of the preparation of our study for the First Report, the Vice President was a member
of the National Security Council; the chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council and of
the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development; the alternate chairman of the
Council for Urban Affairs, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy, and the Council on Environ-
mental Quality; the Office of Intergovernmental Relations was under his immediate supervision. 50
U.S.C. § 402 (Supp. 1970); 42 U.S.C. § 247 (Supp. 1970); 33 U.S.C. § 1102 (Supp. 1970); 3 C.F.R.
102, 103, 122, 105 (1969). In the meantime, the former Council on Environmental Quality has been
transformed into a Cabinet Committee, of which the Vice President is again the alternate chairman, 35
Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970). He has also been made the alternate chairman of the Council for Rural Affairs,
3 C.F.R. 2o6 (x969); and, perhaps most importantly, he is a member of the Domestic Council estab-
lished pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 2 of x970. For historical background, see David, The Vice
Presidency: Its Institutional Evolution and Contemporary Status, 29 J. POLITICS 721 (x967).
rt 22 U.S.C. § 287 (1964). Literature on this arrangement is quite sparse. See A. BEICHIaAN, THE
"OTHER STATE DEP/nTmVmNT." THE UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS--ITs ROLE IN THE
MAIING Op FOREIGN POLICY 194-96 (1968); and, for the dilemma posed by conflicting loyalties, Sen.
Vandenberg's letter of January 9, 1947, to Mrs. Roosevelt, A. VANDENBERG, THlE PRIVATE PAPERS OF
SENATOR VANDENBERG 330-31 (A. Vandenberg, Jr., ed. 1952).
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also applicable to other questions, including coordination (question 4). The
authority "to require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the
executive departments," conferred upon the President by article II, section 2, of the
Constitution, it is stated,
has apparently never been seriously considered, in the United States, as an insti-
tutionalization of informatory and advisory authority. Quite the contrary, the
prevailing view appears to be that a statutory channelling of the President's
sources of information would be unconstitutional. The view expressed in (West
Germany) that political advice to the government is a public function and hence
is subject to limitations imposed by constitutional law, appears strange to Amer-
ican constitutional thought. Thus, every President informs himself from what-
ever source and by whatever procedures he deems appropriate.50
This passage was to find its way into the report of the Project Group.17
Just as there is little purpose to be served by repeating here our observations on
the formal constitutional position of the American federal executive, there is almost
equally small need for a repetition of the rather extensive descriptions of Presidential
information networks and coordination mechanisms. To a large extent, these are
based on quite familiar publications and on a few interviews conducted within the
academic and research communities; contributors to the present symposium are
prominently represented under both headings.58 On the purely descriptive level,
there is hardly any claim of originality-except, perhaps, for the discovery that
entries under "Management Consultants" in the Washington yellow pages yield a
good bit of otherwise quite elusive information about federal policy contract research,
including the gem, in at least one advertisement, "Governments Only."
Evaluation of American institutions and practices with a view to their suit-
ability to West German conditions is likely to be of more interest here. The Project
Group had not, in terms, called for such an evaluation by its consultants in charge
of country studies. However, it quite understandably expressed an interest in in-
formation as to the defects of foreign systems in actual experience, as indicated
especially by question 7 (deficiencies of the present system and efforts at reform).
After all, it is greatly preferable, for governments as well, to learn from the failures of
others.
This frame of reference necessarily gives our recommendations and conclusions
vi FrRsT REPORT 221, citing B5CENF&aDE, supra note 9, at 187 et seq.; 249 et seq. for the view
expressed by some authorities in West Germany (see also note 43 supra); and Bundy, How Foreign
Policy is Made-Logic and Experience, 30 U. Pir. L. REy. 437, 441 (1969), for the prevailing
American position.
STi Frsr REPORT 254.
58 Our study acknowledges invaluable assistance from Professors Thomas E. Cronin and Norman
Thomas; Allen Schick gave of his time to introduce us into the mysteries of PPBS. 2 FIrst REPoRT 212.
Professor Harvey C. Mansfield's then unpublished paper on federal executive reorganization, pre-
sented originally at the 1968 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, furnished most
of the information for our discussion of government reorganization; see 2 Frst REPORT, 213-15, 258
n.14. Mansfield, Federal Executive Reorganization: Thirty Years of Experience, 29 Pua. AD. REv. 332
(x969).
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a somewhat negative bias. It is hoped, however, that what was said in that connec-
tion, and what will be repeated below, will not be taken as implying any personal
dissatisfaction with an exceptionally generous and pleasant host country.
The American system of government appears to have two built-in dysfunctional
elements of constitutional magnitude. First, the President has only limited, and
frequently insufficient, means for the legislative and budgetary implementation of
his program. Secondly-and somewhat paradoxically-his responsibilities within
the executive department, encompassing the totality of the functions of Queen, prime
minister, and cabinet, are dangerously dose to requiring superhuman talents and
energy.
It is believed that these structural weaknesses are not outweighed by the advan-
tages of a uniform personalized executive with stable tenure for a period of years.
In any event, the very history of government reorganization on the federal level is
strong evidence that there are serious and persistent problems of government
efficiency in a presidential system. It was concluded, therefore, that the adoption of
such a system would not, by itself, offer substantial advantages to a country with a
functioning system of responsible cabinet government. This conclusion is again
echoed in the Project Group report. It seems to receive added weight from the
amazingly swift and comprehensive implementation of the recommendations of
that report, especially if contrasted with the markedly different experiences of the
Brownlow Committee."
On the other hand, the United States has had, for some time, the most vital and
productive economic system in the world. Furthermore, its social system, while not
quite as open and egalitarian as sometimes claimed, is still in marked contrast to
West Germany's "two societies," or "halbierte Gesellschaft" so eloquently described
and decried by Professor Dahrendorf.' It seems reasonable to assume that the
exceptionally high degree of receptivity and adaptability of the American federal
executive is, in good measure, causally interrelated with the dynamism of the Amer-
ican economy and the openness of American society. If this assumption is accepted,
the three phenomena of American federal government singled out as particularly
startling to orderly minds trained in the German civil service tradition are highly
likely to be prized assets rather than curious liabilities. These are (i) the massive
uncertainties and manifest neglect of organizational constitutional law; (2) the
heterogeneous origins, short tenures, and hence, seemingly somewhat amateur char-
acter of the top ranks of the federal political executive; and (3) the inclination to
farm out to non-governmental organisms, on a contract basis, the formulation of
federal public policy.
'I See p. 632 supra; BROWNLOW, supra note 3, at 383-402, 413-22; and especially R. POLENBERG, RE-
ORGANIZING ROOSEVELT'S GOVERNMENT. THE CONTRovERsy OvER EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION 1936-x939
(1966).
OOR. DAmENDORF, GESELTSCHAFT uNm DE OxRATIE IN DEuTscHLAND 301 (1968). Professor Dahren-
dorf's own translation, SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY 273 (1967), uses the term, "divided
society."
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i. Organizational Constitutional Law
The neglect of organizational constitutional law in the United States is, prima
facie, nothing short of scandalous. Again and again in interviews and conversations
with knowledgable persons in and out of government, we heard the complaint that
"nobody teaches you how the government is run." Standard books of instruction on
constitutional law used at American law schools, even if called "Cases and Mate-
rials," proved to be literally without the slightest guidance for our study. As
Professor William W. Van Alstyne demonstrated by a postcard poll of teachers of
constitutional law at American universities, this neglect of the subject is rather firmly
rooted in lack of basic knowledge. 1 Monographic legal literature on organizational
constitutional law is almost totally lacking. 2
It might be contended that this neglect is merely the result of a division of
labor, traditional at least since the epic Burgess-Dwight confrontation at Columbia
University,'s between litigation-oriented law schools and institution-oriented depart-
ments of political science, and that, in any event, the rather remarkable expansion of
the concept of justiciability in recent years64 is likely to kindle the interest of pro-
fessional lawyers in constitutional questions not previously capable of judicial
resolution. However, this would presuppose, at least until the total eclipse of the
political-questions doctrine and the disappearance of all obstacles to justiciability
grounded on the cases-and-controversies doctrine and on standing, that political
scientists are carrying on the traditions of Burgess, Willoughby, and, perhaps,
Corwin.65
"lLetter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, z965, at 38, col 3 (Late City Edition):
'In a mail poll I submitted [four] questions ... based on the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution,
to all professors currently teaching constitutional law in American law schools. Each was asked to respond
impromptu, without looking up the answers in advance.
"Ninety-six responses to each of the four questions were received. Over-all, 70 per cent of the
answers submitted were technically incorrect. Specifically, 62 per cent, 82 per cent, 66 per cent and 69
per cent of the answers submitted to the first through the fourth question, respectively, were incorrect."
" By way of contrast, see Professor Dagtoglou's Comment, [I969] PuB. L. lox-III, which reviews
over 5o West German monographs on constitutional law published in x968. Ci. his Comment, [597o]
id. at 317-29, which lists a somewhat lesser number for 1969.
63 J. GoEBEL et al., A HsTo oF Tm ScHooL oF LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVaSIT ch. 4 (955); J.
BURass, REMINIscENcS OF AN AMERICAN SCHoLAR, THE BEGINNINGs OF COLUMBIA UNIvERsIn, ch. 6
(1934).
"Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (x962); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486 (z969); and, after our study was completed, Association of Data Service Org., Inc. v.
Camp, 396 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 396 U.S. 159 (970).
" A. SOMIT & J. TANENHAUs, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE: FRoMd BURoESS TO
BmVioRA SiM 8-I9 (1967); J. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW (1890); V.
WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed., 1929). E. S. Corwin would
seem to be more correctly classified as a political and constitutional historian, see, e.g., E. CostiwN, Th
PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957 (4 th rev. ed. 1957), and as an outstanding "case law"-
oriented constitutional lawyer, as witness his perennial, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEAs TODAY
(i2th ed. 1958) and his monumental THE CoNSanrTsoN OF THE UNITED STATES ANNOTATED, ANAL-
YSlS AND INTERPRETATION (1953). He does not appear to have been much persuaded by the one
attempt to set forth American constitutional conventions in the British understanding of that term,
which significantly was undertaken by a British author writing in England. H. HORwiLL, THE UsAGES
OF TIE AMERICAN CoNsTrTEoN (1925); Corwin, Book Review, 2o Am. POL. SC. REV. 436 (1926).
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Manifestly, that has not been the case. We might speculate on the causes, and
especially on the relative weight to be attributed to the scramble for a slice in the
lucrative market made up by an estimated one million captive buyers per annum of
assigned textbooks on American Government; the two-step process of professional
legal education which stamps much of political science instruction as undergraduate
and "pre-legal" (perversely adding incentive to the emulation of law teaching at a
"lower" academic level); and the general decline of public law as a prestigious
discipline in increasingly behavior-oriented political science departments.66 On pure-
ly intellectual grounds, the reason suggested last seems to be the only one intrinsically
worthy of respect. Still, it is acceptable only to the extent that the behavioral approach
faithfully reflects the reality of organizational constitutional law in the United States.
This depends, quite simply, on whether American organizational constitutional law
is dominated by political behavior or governed by constitutional convention. The
answer is not necessarily foreclosed by the predilection of common-law trained
minds for judicially enforceable rights; the British constitution and its overseas
transplants illustrate that a common law system is indeed eminently capable of
generating the opinio necessitatis iuris which distinguishes constitutional convention
from politically convenient custom.6" However, it is quite useless to pursue this
question further with regard to the United States. Here, political behavior not
subject to judicial sanction is manifestly treated as free from legal restraint. The
prevalence of the "bad man" theory of the law6" on the constitutional level even
extends to the interpretation of constitutional provisions that are not, or not as yet,
subject to judicial scrutiny.
To mention some examples: When testifying before the Jackson Committee,
Governor Nelson Rockefeller asserted that the Vice President was a member of the
Legislative department by virtue of his constitutional position as president of the Sen-
ate, and could therefore not be delegated executive functions in view of the
" As to the decline of public law as a prestigious discipline, see Somit & Tanenhaus, Trends in
American Political Science: Some A4nalytical Notes, 57 Am. PoL. Sex. Rav. 933, 940-41 with tables IV-
VI (1963). Schubert, Behavioral Research in Public Law, 57 Am. POL. Ses. Rav. 433, 445 (I963),
speaks of "the long period during which public law was an exotic bayou, cut off from the mainstream
of theoretical and methodological advances in political science." Whether or not behaviorism has
come to the rescue as there predicted is immaterial for present purposes, since judicial behaviorism
comes rather close to being the exact antidote to any threat of the revival of interest in organizational
constitutional law on the part of political scientists. Cf. Verney, The Education of a Political Scientist, 3
CAN. J. POL. SCI. 345, 352 (1970): "Presidential government . . . has succeeded in the United States
but has never been successfully adopted by other countries. (Perhaps this explains why American stu-
dents of comparative politics have ignored traditional governmental institutions, which indicate the
uniqueness of the United States, and have concentrated on the political process where Americans behave,
or are thought to behave, like people elsewhere.)"
"'See A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTIruTON, ch. 14-15 (ioth
ed. 1959); I. JENNINGs, Tan LAw OF THE CONSTIrTUToN, ch. 3 ( 5th ed. 1959); J. MITCHELL, CON.
rrrtxoNAL LAW 26-39 (2d ed. 1968); British Coal Corporation v. The King, [1935] A.C. 500, 511
(P.C.); Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1968] 3 All E.R. 561, 573 (P.C.) Cf. Adegbenro v. Akintola,
[1963] A.C. 614, 631-32 (P.C.).
"8 First set forth in Holmes, The Path of the Law, io HAiv. L. REv. 457, 459 (1887).
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incompatibility rule.0 9 (The real reason for the sparing use of the Vice President
in the Executive department is not this quaint construction of the vice presidency
as a Legislative estate with an Executive remainder, but rather the fact that the
President has no control over the Vice President's term of office.70) The constitu-
tional locus of the reorganization power is largely unsettled. The prevalent practice
under the Reorganization Acts of executive reorganization by presidential plan sub-
ject to congressional veto is open to grave constitutional objections. The "con-
gressional veto" was, in fact, deemed unconstitutional by President Roosevelt.rl
The current Reorganization Act, in keeping with the somewhat wavering tradi-
tion established by the Reorganization Act of 1939, requires an act of Congress for
the creation, abolition, or complete merger of government departments. Their prin-
cipal officers are, collectively, a constitutional organ by virtue of the Twenty-fifth
Amendment; and their appointments are subject to approval by the Senate. Yet,
nothing seems to prevent the President from conferring personal cabinet rank, with-
out the necessity of Senate approval, on members of the White House staff.72
More recent examples would include the assertion of a presidential prerogative
in the appointment of Supreme Court justices that is clearly contrary to historical
precedent.7 3 At the other extreme, we find a veto message described as containing
"9 H. JAcxsoN, JR., THE NATIONAL SEcRuTy COUNCcL-JACXSON SUBCOMUITTE P.aERS ON POLICY-
MAIING AT TmE PRSIEiNTIAL LEVEL 179 (1965) (testimony of July z, i96o).0 This point is generally regarded as settled by former President Hoover's testimony of January i6,
1956. Hearings on the Administrative Vice President Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization of the
Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1956) (testimony of Mr. Hoover).
"
1 Jackson, 4 Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HAv. L. REV. 1353 (1953). See generally Ginnane, The
Control of Federal 4dministration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HAsv. L. REV. 569
0953). For an excellent brief discussion of the reorganization power which had previously escaped our
notice, see J. KALLENBACH, Tam AMERICAN CMEF EXECUTnVE. TIM PRESIDENCY AND nam GovRns. ops
380-87 (x966).
"
2 Dr. Arthur Burns received this rank in January, x969; that seems to have set a precedent for the
top White House Office officials of the Nixon Administration.
" In a letter of March 31, 1970 to Senator William B. Saxbe of Ohio concerning his (ultimately
unsuccessful) nomination of Judge G. Harrold Carswell to the U.S. Supreme Court, President Nixon
stated:
"What is centrally at issue in this nomination is the constitutional responsibility of the President to
appoint members of the Court--and whether this responsibility can be frustrated by those who wish to
substitute their own philosophy or their own subjective judgment for that of the one person entrusted by
the Constitution with the power of appointment . . .
"[U]nder the Constitution it is the duty of the President to appoint and of the Senate to advise
and consent. But if the Senate attempts to substitute its judgment as to who should be appointed, the
traditional constitutional balance is in jeopardy and the duty of the President under the Constitution
impaired."
1I6 CONG. REc. S4937 (daily ed. April 2, 1970).
The assertion that the President is "the one person entrusted by the Constitution with the power of
appointment" (emphasis supplied) is contrary to the wording of the Constitution, which provides, in
article 2, § 2, t 2, that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, shall appoint . . . judges of the supreme court. .. ." (emphasis supplied). The letter quoted
above is said to be in large part the work of Charles Colson, the President's legal adviser, who has been
quoted as saying, "The legal brief we prepared on this used the word 'nominate' all the way through,
but it came out 'appoint' in the letter." NEwswEEx, April 13, 197o, at x5. Surely, state papers deserve
more discriminating attention. Quite apart from this, however, the cardinal contention that the Senate
may not substitute its own philosophy or its own subjective judgment for that of the President in
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a "political-science lecture on Presidential prerogatives" in point as if there could
be the slightest doubt about his legal entitlement to veto federal enactments at will74
2. Personal Mobility of the Political Executive
American observers are likely to be troubled more by the current scholarly neglect
of organizational constitutional law than by its actual state. They would tend to
regard massive ambiguity and uncertainty in this area as, on balance, a positive
factor, since the absence of clear rules prevents the ossification of traditional struc-
tures by constitutional mandate. However, they are likely to be somewhat less
complacent about the selection and tenure of the political Executive below cabinet
level. There are roughly 125 government officials in the ranks of Secretary to
Assistant Secretary, and in corresponding positions with different nomenclatures. A
Secretary can be expected to have a tenure of about three years; the average tenure
of Assistant Secretaries, on the other hand, is likely to be around two years. It is
generally estimated that the first year in office is largely spent on what might be
called on-the-job training 75
Small wonder, then, that in i96o, the Senate at the request of the Jackson Com-
mittee on National Policy Machinery adopted a resolution expressing
the sense of the Senate that individuals appointed to administrative and policy-
making posts should be willing to serve for a period long enough to permit them
to contribute effectively in their assigned tasks .... 76
As the Brookings studies have shown, the record is not quite so bleak. The
average public service record of the political executive at the time of initial sub-
cabinet level appointment is five years; and there is a substantial flow of appointments
from within political and professional civil service ranks of the various departments.
On the other hand, the recruiting process is hardly likely to inspire confidence in
the professional soundness of the appointments made. The appointment of a
specially qualified Assistant Secretary pursuant to the recommendation of an equally
qualified Secretary might not be a mere chance event, but it is plainly rather
exceptional 77
The disadvantages of this top-level spoils system with payoffs in social prestige or
public service satisfaction are substantial. Besides the obvious drawbacks of amateur
administration as such, there is above all the lack of confidence of the top levels of
judicial appointment matters is contrary to historical precedent and the overwhelming weight of the
informed opinion. See, e.g., KALLENBACir, supra note 71, at 393. Cf. Black, A Note on Senatorial Con-
sideration of Supreme Court Appointees, 79 YALE L.J. 657 (1970), which quite unintentionally under-
scores our remarks above.
7' Semple, Jr., The Middle American Who Edits Ideas for Nixon, N.Y. Times Magazine, Apr. 12,
x970 at 32, 69.
7 See generally D. STANLEY, D. MANN & J. Dome, MEN WHO GovERN-A BsooaAPmcAL Posmn Os
FEDERAL POLITrcAL ExacurivFs (1967); D. MANN AND J. Dosm, THE AssisTANT SEczRERrEs (1965);
Mann, The Selection of Federal Political Executives, 58 Am. PoL. Sci. REv. 8x (1964).
"" S. Res. 338, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., io6 CONG. REc. 15705 (i96o).
7 See STANLEY, supra note 75, at 41, and generally Mann, supra note 75.
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the professional civil service in departmental leadership, and a consequent strength-
ening of the Bureau-Congress-clients triangle which obstructs the implementation
of presidential policy.7 On the other hand, it is difficult to envisage a system that
is more conducive to the rapid exchange of ideas and information between govern-
ment, industry, and the academic community.
3. Government Policy Formulation by Research Contract
The Executive Office of the President owes its existence to the recommendations
of the Brownlow Committee; the PPB System is a creation of the RAND Corpo-
ration. These two standard examples serve to demonstrate the significance of con-
-tract research for the formulation of public policy in the United States. However,
they may be likened to the tips of otherwise rather unexplored icebergs. "Hard"
information about federal contract research on government policy, as contradistin-
guished from science and technology,79 is not so readily obtainable.
We know that the sixteen Contract Research Centers of the Defense Department
at one time employed a total of 346 social scientists (enough to staff the departments
of economics, political science, and sociology of at least three universities), and that
the Department spent about $30 million a year on policy research contracts80 This
figure is in marked contrast to the $5 million budget of the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research in the State Department 8l
Critics have called attention to the possibility of conflict between the policy
planning operations of the State and Defense Departments, to the "hawkish" bias
of the latter's principal consultants, and to errors in judgment in the formulation of
projects and the choice of contractors. The classic example of the latter is the
'Tax Americana" project, which charged the Douglas Aircraft Corporation with the
task of projecting the world political situation in i985P2 Seemingly, a somewhat
more short-range analysis of the economic future of Douglas Aircraft would have
been more appropriate.
" See Brown, The President and the Bureaus: Time for a Renewal of Relationships? 26 Pu. AD.
REv. 174 (1966).
" C. DANHoF, GovEnmMENT CONTRACTING AND TECHNOLICCL CHANGE (I968); M. REAGAN, SCIENCE
AND THE FEDR.L PATRON (1969). G. LYoNs, THE UNEASY PARTNERSHIp-SocIAL SCIENCE AND THE FED.
ERAL GovRRNMENT IN THE TwENTIETH CENTURY (1969), a veritable goldmine of information, appeared
after the conclusion of our study. I
"°For details, see Hearings on Defense Department Sponsored Foreign Aflairs Research Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, goth Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
S Platig, Research and Analysis, 38o THrE ANNALS 50, 56 (1968). For the origins of this disparity,
see D. AcHEsoN, PRESENT AT THE CREATION, ch. x8 (1969); and for the reorganization of State Depart-
ment research activities since our study, 61 Ds'T STATE BUL. 74 (1969).
82 Green, Science, Government and the Case of Rand, A Singular Pluralism, 20 WoR.LD POLITICS 301
(I968); Kaufman, As Eisenhower Was Saying . . . "We Must Guard 4gainst Unwarranted Influence
By the Military-Industrial Complex," N.Y. Times Magazine, June 22, x969, at io; Rice, The Cold-War
College Think Tanks, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, July, 1969, at 22. Quite another question, and a some-
what neglected one, is the effect of such contract research on the universities. Cf. Jaffe, Professors
and Judges as Advisors to Government: Reflections on the Roosevelt-Franklurter Relationship, 83 HARv.
L. REV. 366, 368-73 (1969).
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It should be recalled, however, that we are dealing with a subject that is discreet
but not discrete. Federal contract research on policy questions is pervasive but not
centralized; and failures and conflicts, being more newsworthy, have greater sur-
facing power. The advantages of seeking guidance for decisions involving federal
public policy by contract research seem obvious. These offer almost unlimited flex-
ibility in the choice of informants; ready access to the most current levels of insight
of the academic and research communities; and savings, both in funds and in
maneuverability, by the avoidance of the alternative solution of creating ad hoc
bureaucracies for policy problems as they arise.
On the other hand, a traditional view of responsible government would require
that public policy be formulated by politically and legally accountable officials and
public servants. While such ultimate responsibility is not necessarily waived by the
contractual procurement of policy ideas and programs, there seems little doubt that
this practice does, in fact, shift public decisions to a non- or pre-public sphere.
That is especially the case where the progress of the study commissioned has already
led to a crystallizing of informed opinion, or where as yet unresearched possibilities
are obscured by carefully elaborated alternative recommendations.
4. Summary: State and Society in the United States and West Germany
Our conclusion was that the lack of clarity in organizational constitutional law,
the remarkably high mobility of a heterogeneous political executive, and the extensive
use of contract research were phenomena of a political system that did not recognize
a significant distinction between "state" and "society." As already mentioned, these
factors were deemed crucial for a highly receptive and adaptable political leadership
system, and at the same time causally interconnected with an open society and a vital
economy.
Implicitly accepting Professor Dahrendorf's trenchant critique of West Germany
as a "halbierte Gesellschaft" managed by a law-trained "service class" quite un-
receptive to the needs and aspirations of the "lower" half of the population, 3 we
posed the question whether a radical reduction of the influence of the German
service class was not in order. This could be achieved, it was suggested, by a sub-
stantial increase in the number of political officials and, possibly, the massive use of
contract research on policy questions.
Such a course of action would be likely to decrease the significance of the Rule of
Law in organizational constitutional law. Indeed, greater flexibility in this area
might even be the pre-condition for the creative activity of a broad and dynamic
political leadership group co-opted by constant interchange with the universities
83 DAHRENwoRu, supra note 6o, xo6 et seq. of the German and 94 et seq. of the English editions.
Note, incidentally, the recently declining prestige of lawyers in West German society, discussed by W.
KAuTpa, DIE HUTER VoN RacirT uNa ORDN.ING. DIE SOZiALE HaRKUNFT, EMESEHUNG uNi AusasmwNo
DER DEUTSCHEN Juma-at (x969), and by Rasehorn, fursten auf dem soziologischen Prifstand, [1970]
Nana JuaMusrcsHE WOCEmNsCMUFr 24.
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and the economy. But would West German society still respect a State that had so
drastically opened itself to the people?
A somewhat different question was whether the added costs of such drastic reforms
were worthwhile. As one of the two super-powers in a still basically bipolar world,
the United States necessarily had to aspire to a position of leadership in all fields
of significance. States with more modest means simply could not attempt to operate
on the same scale.
This was not to say, we concluded, that the American example was, but for some
technical details, only of anecdotal or antidotal interest for West German government
and administrative reformers. The point was, rather, to draw attention to the possible
consequences of the reception of those constitutional and administrative institutions
of the United States which were substantially shaped by the American social system
and a specific "American way of life." There will be occasion to return to these
remarks further below 84
B. Foreign Materials in the Report
As already indicated, several references to foreign systems of government found
their way into the Project Group Report. In the following, these references will be
mentioned as they occur. It is hoped that this will afford some insights into the
practical value of comparative government which might outweigh the tedium of
recital by rote.
The first part of the Report, dealing with the delimitation of the spheres of com-
petence of the federal ministries, contains about half a dozen such references. At the
outset, it is pointed out that here, foreign experiences were found to be helpful only
as to some details. These latter would appear to include the following: First, on
the issue of special-purpose ministries, the French experience with its tendency
toward the "technocratization" of political leadership is invoked to buttress a nega-
tive recommendation. Second, the rejection of the "optimal" small group figure of
seven or nine as a criterion of cabinet size is reinforced by reference to British and
French experience, although "in view of differences in constitutional structure, such
comparisons with foreign countries ... do not afford an even approximately reliable
standard." This is followed by a rejection of the Inner Cabinet device as not only
"& See p. 664 infra. For a striking parallel, see Ridley, French Technocracy and Comparative Govern-
ment, 14 PoLMcA. STuDnEs 34, 52 (1966):
"Technocratic leadership depends on the French educational system and on the general structure
of careers. We could not early copy French administrative or managerial instiutions, even if we
should want to, because we live in a different society with a different culture. That is only saying,
of course, what is often said by those who argue that we need to reform our own educational
and recruitment systems if we are to modernize Britain. Even this, however, would not necessarily
give us anything like the French technocracy. British technocrats would not automatically develop
the same sense of responsibility that flows from the French notion of the positive state. One
cannot so easily acquire a tradition that has been built up over centuries. We are back at the
starting point. What practical lesson can one in fact learn from comparative studies?"
For some tentative answers to that question, see p. 663 infra.
Tim BitowNtow CommiFE
beyond the mandate of the Project Group because it would require constitutional
amendment, but also as reportedly unsuitable for German constitutional life.
Third, the creation of a Ministry for Coordination was not recommended because
domestic and foreign experience showed the futility of coordination especially of
fundamental views on the same level. Fourth, on the positive side, cabinet status
for the Post Office was justified, inter alia, by similar status in other countries.
Finally, in reiteration of previous comments on coordination between equals, British
as well as West German experience is invoked in support of the proposition that a
minister without portfolio might be more effectively used for primary political
tasks than as a coordinator at the cabinet level, as he was hardly likely to be successful
in the latter task.s5
The section on parliamentary state secretaries, ministers of state, and ministers
without portfolio apparently does not contain a single mention of foreign materials.
On the other hand, some key references thereto are to be found in the third and last
part of the report, relating to the improvement of the machinery of the Federal
Chancellor and Government. The conclusions drawn from the foreign country and
West German state studies are summarized as follows:
The problems found to exist in the machinery of the [West German] federal
government are to be encountered, to a lesser or greater extent, in all foreign
countries covered by this inquiry. They are equally present in the government
machinery of the [West German] states.
Certain peculiarities are essentially the products of historical developments.
The constitutional position of government institutions is only of minor sig-
nificance in relation to existing inadequacies. Comparable deficiencies are found
in the Presidential, Cabinet, and Chancellor systems. Therefore, none of the
problems could be solved merely by, for instance, introducing the Presidential
system in the Federal Republic.
All of these systems of government have, in addition to conventional tasks, met
with new problems that make it necessary to further develop the traditional system.8 6
There also is a reference to the PPB System which is found to be less effective than
the West German system of intermediate-term budget planning; and to British
thought on the reduction of cabinet size, the French Planning Office, and the
Swedish system of executive government (the latter had not been the subject of a
special study87).
By far the most detailed and frequent mentions of foreign materials are to be
found in the two appendices to Part III of the Report. The first, which is a method-
ological survey entitled "Basic Remarks on the Process of Political Decision," con-
tains the following observation:
The organization of professional advice in the governmental system requires
detailed studies, which the Project Group has only been able to initiate in the few
8 1 F lis REPORT 7, 10, II, 12, 21, 24.
'lid. at 19o.
117Id. at 192, 205.
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months of its activities. Here, it will be especially necessary to have recourse to
the manifold experiences in France, England, and the United States, in order to
utilize further sources for the critical evaluation of our own system 8
The Project Group then singled out for special mention some methods of political
planning developed in recent years in the United States. Here, it was able to rely
on a particularly thorough report on "Political Planning," prepared for the Project
Group under the direction of Professor Obernd~rfer. The planning techniques
referred to include the Delphi Method, systems analysis, cost-benefit analysis, relevance
procedure, operations research, PPBS, network planning, and electronic data process-
ing. Discussion is mainly descriptive, but in connection with PPBS, it is stated:
In view of political and constitutional conditions that differ from those of
the United States, and the (in some respects) already further developed budgetary
process of the Federal Republic, the PPBS cannot simply be adopted by German
administration. Nevertheless, the focal points of the system ... are of significance
for German planning processes as well.89
The second appendix to Part III of the Report contains summaries, by the
Project Group, of the studies on Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy,
Austria, Switzerland, and the West German states. Except for these latter, all
references, of course, are to foreign institutions. Nevertheless, occasional comparisons
with West German conditions, and especially selections of subjects for further study,
supply some evidence as to the practical value of the comparative approach in the
judgment of the Project Group.
There are two such references to Great Britain, both of them of the former
variant. First, British opinion as to the ineffectiveness of a twenty-member cabinet
as a working group for the development of policy guidelines is related to a similar
judgment prevailing in West Germany. Secondly, and more significantly, the
process of information circulation within the political system is described as work-
ing "much better" in Great Britain than it does in West Germany. This is traced
to the central organization of public administration. There are also some remarks,
not expressly comparative, as to the lack of a need for legal norms on coordination
of government activities. Such rules have not been necessary in the past, in the
judgment of the Project Group, in view of the prevalence of a basic political and
social attitude characterized by a desire to cooperate and a willingness to compromise.
Furthermore, attention is called to the inhibitions of British civil servants against
8 1d. at 238-39.
89 Id. at 240-245. The Obernd5rfer study, entitled "Political Planning," will be found in 2 id. at 313-
459. More recently, a higher civil servant has expressed the opinion that while West Germany has an
exemplary legal framework for fiscal planning, the United States has furnished the exemplary methods and
techniques for modem intermediate-term fiscal planning. Mennel, Mehrjihrige Finanzplamng im Ausland,
29 FINAzZARCMV 75, 88 (197o). But see Briimmerhoff, Das "Planning-Programming-Budgeting System,"
id. at 64, 74.
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political activity, which is said to be rooted in English mentalityY° It seems reason-
able to see some traces of implied self-criticism in this passage.
With respect to the United States, there is litde attempt at comparison, save for
a reference to the obvious difference between the presidential system and the unique
combination of the Chancellor, Cabinet, and Department systems in West Germany
in article 65 of the Basic Law.9" However, no less than three areas are singled out
for further study. First, the Project Group notes a trend toward the evolution of
the Executive Office of the President, and more particularly of the White House staff,
into a de facto presidential cabinet with a position superior to that of the federal
cabinet. Its interest in additional research of this development is probably traceable
to apprehensions about the constitutional implications of the creation of a planning
staff in the Chancellor's Office 2
Secondly, the Project Group expresses interest in the non-fiscal activities of the
Bureau of the Budget, especially as regards planning, coordination, direction, and
control of government activity. Finally, it singles out for detailed future attention
what is termed the "expansion of planning horizons" through the use of presidential
advisory committees and of contract research, especially to the extent that the latter
"impinges upon political goal planning and has for this reason met with special
scepticism.""3
The French system of government is described in somewhat greater detail in
the Report than is the American, but interest in it seems substantially more limited.
The Project Group is understandably interested in the working of the Commissariat
Gen&al du Plan, and expresses an intention to seek more information both as to
the type of plan elaborated (ie., whether it is unilinear or alternative), and as to
the planning methods and techniques employed by the French General Planning
Commission, with a view to determining their suitability for West Germany. Other
than that, it merely notes that the extensive employment of special staffs by French
cabinet ministers has kept the category of political public servants relatively small
as compared to West Germany 4
Interest in Italy is minimal:
In judging the capacity of the system for political planning, the short tenures
in office of the governments will have to be considered. This circumstance hardly
permits comparisons with the Federal Republic, especially as regards political goal
definitionP 5
A similar lack of interest is manifested in Austria, because the unanimity rule
for cabinet decisions, as contrasted with the vital position of the Chancellor under
°00 FIRST REPORT, supra note 5, at 250, 251.
- Id. at 253. See p. 637 suPraT.
021 FRSr REPORT B53-54; see p. 647 supra.
03 1 Fnsrr REPORT 254, 255- Cf. Jaffe, supra note 82.
4 1 Fiasr REPORT 259, 260.
or Id. at 262.
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the West German system, has inhibited the development of central planning in-
stitutionsY As regards Switzerland, the Project Group limits itself to noting what
is termed the most advanced level of government reform thinking of all countries
studied, and the "almost complete" identity of Swiss and West German criticism of
the respective systems of government. 7
Rather expectedly, such similarities are also observed with respect to the West
German state governments studied. Here, the Hamburg "Planning Triangle"
is singled out for special attentionY8 It should be noted that the superb report on
German state governments made under the direction of Professor Fritz Scharpf
also included substantial amounts of confidential information which were omitted
from the published version.99
In its introduction to the appendix volume, the Project Group mentioned the need
for further studies on the United States, France, Great Britain, and-somewhat sur-
prisingly-on Italy, as well as on the West German states. Its estimate of the value
of the foreign country and West German studies for the First Report itself is summed
up in one sentence:
With respect to some aspects of the problem studied, the assumption has been
confirmed that there are in foreign countries, but also in the West German States,
methods, techniques and beginnings of organizational forms for an improvement of
the political decision process which deserve special attention in continued work on
government and administrative reform.
This will have to be read in conjunction with an earlier characterization of reports
on the West German states as "in part, very instructive"0 -0 an evaluation that is not
repeated in the passage just quoted.
CONCLUSION
The first two sections of the present paper seek to summarize the main features
of the First Report of the West German Project Group for Government and Admin-
istrative Reform, and to outline the impact of that report on government reorganiza-
tion in West Germany. Although it is hoped that they will be of interest to students
of government organization in other countries merely by virtue of the subject matter
chosen, they are, at base, secondhand descriptions by a relative outsider in another
language-the dreary standard fare of what used to be so euphemistically called
"Comparative Government."' 1
9 d. at 265.97 1 d. at 267.
"Id. at 271-73. The "Hamburg Triangle" consists of the Planning Staff of the City-State Council
Office (Senatskanzlei), the central Organization Authority, and the Finance Department. For details,
see 2 id. at 287-88.
2 FirsT REPORT 267-313; see the Project Group's introduction to that volume, id. at v, vi.
1 Id. at vi.
101 Von Beyme, Mdglichleiten und Grenzen der vergleichenden Regierungslehre, 7 POL1IMMscE VIER-
TELJTAlisscH-IsFr 63, 78 n.36 (1966), notes "drops in information levels at linguistic and political
frontiers," and observes, with refreshing candor: "A book is seldom found worth translating into
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The third section, on the other hand, pursues somewhat more ambitious aims.
It seeks to render a reasonably comprehensive account of those portions of the Report
and of the author's country study on the United States which might be of sig-
nificance in assaying the practical value of foreign country studies in connection
with government reorganization or, more generally, the analytical utility of com-
parative public law.
The conclusion will have to be that assaying itself. It will rest on three criteria,
first alone and ultimately in combination: (i) the utility of foreign country studies
for West German government reorganization planning; (2) the significance of the
West German experience for the United States; and (3) the value of studies such
as the ones here discussed for insights into the nature and the workings of political
institutions generally.
The utility of the foreign studies for West German government reorganization
planning seems directly proportional to the distance of their findings from the dis-
tinguishing characteristics of the respective foreign political systems described. There
is more interest in methods than in institutions, and more interest in techniques
than in methods. This might be another way of saying that while political planning
and decision-making may in time become a truly international discipline in the
same manner as the rather obvious precursor, business management, 102 the study of
political institutions is not likely to achieve the same degree of cosmopolitanism.
Political institutions do differ from country to country; and apples are better com-
pared with other apples than with oranges.?°3 This explains the marked preference
of the Project Group for the West German state studies over the foreign country
studies.
For the United States, there are, in the nature of things, only some incidental
insights. The current academic neglect of organizational constitutional law seems
shocking and inexcusable, even though flexibility in this area is likely to be an
asset rather than a liability. Flexible rules are quite capable of study. On a more
mundane level, it is hoped that the partisans and critics of PPBS will not ignore the
gauntlet of the challenger from overseas.' PPBS discussion, which has been quite
parochial, might well profit from an infusion of foreign ideas, based on experience
the language of the country investigated." A notable recent exception would be G. LOEWENBFRG,
PARxriwm r IN E GmEu.Lu PoLiTiCAL Sysram (1966), which is generally acknowledged to be by far
the best work on the Bundestag, and has indeed appeared in German translation: G. LOEWENBEtO,
PAwLaMENTA.IxiUS il POLITIScISEN SYTM DER BuNDESmEPuBLi. DEUTscnLAND (1969). See also
Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 57 YALF L.J. 517 (1966),
which is a condensation of his study, GREN EN RucHTrLzcHE-R VERANTwORTUNG. Dia POLITICAL QtUE-
TnoN-DoKTRTN IN DER REcrTsPREcHuNG DEs SuPREmE CoURT (1965); and Ehmke, supra note 7.
10' The causes for that development become apparent from a reading of Vagts, The Multinational
Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 H-v. L. Rev. 739 (1970).
10' Acknowledgment is due to Hardin, An American Lawyer Looks at Civil jury Trial in Scotland,
xII U. PA. L. REv. 739 (1963).
1o, See pp. 641, 66o supra. Certainly the charge of parochialism cannot be levelled against German
authors on intermediate-term fiscal planning. See especially Mennel, supra note 89.
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with West German intermediate-term budget planning. A third insight would
appear to be that in view of the significance attributed by the Project Group to the
West German state studies, there might be some utility in similar within-country
comparative studies in the United States. On this score, more of the fault (if any)
would seem to lie with the cosmopolitan preoccupations of the comparativists than
with the parochialism of students of public administration; and both appear to be
already in the process of mending their waysY°5
Finally, there is the question as to the utility of comparative studies for a better
understanding of political institutions generally. Because of its limited mandate which
excluded recommendations requiring constitutional amendments for their imple-
mentation, the Project Group felt little temptation to engage in speculation on this
august level. There might also have been some unexpressed preference for the West
German form of government-surely not an entirely misplaced sentiment in the light
of the speedy implementation of the major recommendations of the First Report.
It is difficult to approach the subject here treated without being drawn into
emotionally charged discussions about the relative merits of the presidential and
parliamentary forms of government 0 6 Perhaps, however, we can still utilize
some insights of this study in order to clarify the ultimate issues.
A chief realization for the present author was that at least as regards the (pres-
ently crucial) central executive and legislative institutions, there is less difference
between the British constitution and Continental constitutionalism than there is
between the British and the United States systems of government. The British
model appeared to us as much more rational and appealing; constitutional life
in the United States seemed persistently bedeviled by essentially personal power
conflicts and an undercurrent of disregard for the public character of public office.
This appraisal coincided to a remarkable extent with the trenchant critiques of
a noted British political journalist in Washington. 6'0 However, somehow two key
pieces of the puzzle seemed to be missing. Did the United States really combine
10' Much of creative American research into state and local government and into political behavior
at these levels has been at least intuitively comparative in nature; see, e.g., KALLENBACH, supra note 71,
Recent studies tend to be more explicit as to the method employed; e.g., Chaffey, The Institutionalization
of State Legislatures, A Comparative Study, 23 WEsTERN PoL. Q. X8o (1970). H. JAcoB & K. VINES,
POLITICS IN THE A.mCAN STATES, A CoMPARATnv ANALYSIs (x965), although primarily a teaching
tool, might have heralded the beginning of a new era.
1o6 BRowN.ow, supra note 3, at 356, notes "the curious notion, especially widespread among political
scientists, that the American government would be better if the presidential system were abandoned
and the parliamentary system adopted or at least if every step short of the utter subversion of the
constitutional separation of powers were undertaken that would bring us nearer to the better British
model." C. FRaiEnsusc, THE ImpAcT O'F AmEsuCAsN CONsrTItroNAasm AaaoDn X7-39 (x967) would
appear to be quite immune against this "curious notion"--although not, perhaps, against some others.
See Ryan, Book Review, 47 CAN. B. REv. 330 (1969). For the classic debate on this issue, see Price,
The Parliamentary and Presidential Systems, 3 PUB. AD. RaV. 317 (1943); Laski, The Parliamentary
and Presidential Systems, 4 PUm. AD. REv. 347 (1944); and Price, -A Response to Mr. Laski, id. at 360.
107 Farlie, Help from the Outside, in Tan PRESI ENTIAL ADVIsoRY SYsTEM 144 (T. Cronin & S. Green-
berg eds. 1969); Fairlie, Thoughts on the Presidency, Th Putmae INrarmsr, Autumn, x967, at 28 (x967).
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"the world's most modern society with one of the world's most antique polities"?108
If so, is such a society really compatible with a modem polity?
The first piece has fallen into place by a belated reading of Professor Samuel
Huntington's seminal study from which the quotation is taken. As he convincingly
demonstrates, the United States political system is essentially an English export,
but of Tudor vintage. Even "nineteenth-century Europeans had every reason to
be fascinated by America: It united a liberal society which they were yet to experi-
ence with a conservative politics which they had long since forgotten."10 9
Rather obviously, such a system is not readily exported in turn. However, we
are still looking for the second piece missing from the puzzle, which has now assumed
more definite but also more forbidding shape. Is the political system of the United
States a beneficial, a detrimental, or, perhaps, simply an indifferent factor in the
quest for a modern society? At least one perceptive observer would embrace the
first of these alternatives; 110 there are, no doubt, others-now possibly including
Professor Huntington"--who will espouse different views. The student of public
administration and of comparative government can leave this ultimate question open
once he has realized its existence. By concentrating on the more down-to-earth
problems of improvements in political planning methods and techniques, it is
hopefully concluded, he can seek to achieve insights that are useful and politically
acceptable both to advanced societies and to developed polities.
20 Huntington, Political Modernization: America v. Europe, z8 WoRLD PoLITrcs 378, 406 (1966),
in S. HUNTINGTON, PoLrTIcAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOcIETIEs 129 (1968).
100 HUNTINGTON, supra note 108, at 133. Professor Huntington's thesis is accepted by Long, Re-
flections on Presidential Power, 29 PUB. At>. REv. 442, 443-44 (1969), but rejected by LaPalombara, Book
Review (of Huntington), 78 YaLE L.U. 1253, X269-7o (1969).
110 D. Pmuae, Tim ScrENn'sc EsrATE (1965). See also HUNTINGTON, supra note io8, at 132: "The
American experience demonstrates conclusively that some institutions and some aspects of a society
may become highly modern while other institutions and other aspects retain much of their traditional
form and substance. Indeed, this may be a natural state of affairs. In any system some sort of equi-
librium or balance must be maintained between change and continuity. Change in some spheres
renders unnecessary or impossible change in others. In America the continuity and stability of govern-
mental institutions has permitted the rapid change of society, and the rapid change in society has en-
couraged continuity and stability in government. The relation between polity and society may well
be dialectical rather than complementary."
..1 Professor Huntington's 1968 monograph qualifies his views as set forth above with the follow-
lowing statement:
"These conservative institutions could well change more rapidly in the future than they did in the past.
External security and internal consensus have been the principal factors militating against the moderniza-
tion of American political institutions. The former disappeared in the early twentieth century; the latter
appears at times to be on the verge of disruption. The political institutions suited to a society which
did not have to worry about external dangers may be inappropriate for one continually involved in a
balance of terror, cold war, and military interventions in distant portions of the globe. So also, the prob-
lems of race relations and poverty strengthen demands for action by the national government. The needs
of national defense and social reform could undermine the traditional pluralism inherited from the past
and hasten the centralization of authority and structural differentiation in American political institutions."
HUNTINGTON, supra note io8, at 133. So far as can be determined, this is the only variant from the 1966
text that is not generally supportive of the views therein expressed.
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